378 The Charvalm System of Philosophy. [No. 4, 



be found in the minor and be itself invariably connected with the 

 major.* Now this invariable connection must be a relation destitute 

 of any condition, accepted or disputed ;f and this connection does not 

 possess its power of causing inference by virtue of its existence, as 

 the eye, &c. are the cause of perception, but by virtue of its being 

 known. What then is the means of this connection's being known? 



We will first shew that it is not perception. Now perception is 

 held to be of two kinds, external and internal, i. e. as produced by the 

 external senses, or by the inner sense, mind. The former is not the 

 required means ; for although it is possible that the actual contact of 

 the senses and the object will produce the knowledge of the particu- 

 lar object thus brought in contact, yet as there can never be such 

 contact in the case of the past or the future, the universal proposition* 

 which was to embrace the invariable connection of the middle and 

 major terms in every case, becomes impossible to be known. Nor may 

 you maintain that this knowledge of the universal proposition has the 

 general class as its object, because, if so, there might arise a doubt as 

 to the existence of the invariable connection in this particular case,§ 

 (as, for instance, in this particular smoke as implying fire). 



Nor is internal perception the means, since you cannot establish 

 that the mind has any power to act independently towards an exter- 

 nal object, since all allow that it is dependent on the external senses, 

 as has been said by one of the logicians, " The eye, &c, have their 

 objects as described ; but mind externally is dependent on the others." 



Nor can inference be the means of the knowledge of the universal 

 proposition, since in the case of this inference, we should also require 

 another inference to establish it, and so on, and hence would arise the 

 fallacy of an ad infinitum retrogression. 



Nor can testimony be the means thereof, since we may either al- 

 lege in rephy, in accordance with the Vais'eshika doctrine of Kanada, 

 that this is included in the topic of inference ; or else we may hold that 

 this fresh proof of testimony is unable to leap over the old barrier 



* Literally " must be an attribute of tbe subject and have invariable attend- 

 edness (vyapti.)'''' 



t For the sandigdlia and nis'chita upddhi see Siddhanta Muktavali, p. 125. 

 The former is accepted only by one party. 



X Literally, tbe knowledge of the invariable attendedness (as of smoke by fire). 



§ The attributes of the class are not always found in every member,— thus 

 idiots are men, though man is a rational animal ; and again, this particular smoke 

 might be a sign of a fire in some other place. 



