1862.] Tlw CMrvdka System of Philosophy. 379 



that stopped the progress of inference, since it depends itself on the 

 recognition of a sign, in the form of the language used in the child's 

 presence by the old man •* and moreover there is no more reason for 

 our believing on another's word, that smoke and fire are invariably 

 connected, than for our receiving the ipse dixit of Manu, &c, (which 

 of course we Charvakas reject). 



And again, if testimony were to be accepted as the only means 

 of the knowledge of the universal proposition, then in the case 

 of a man to whom the fact of the invariable connection between 

 the middle and major terms had not been pointed out by another 

 person, there could be no inference of one thing (as fire) on seeing 

 another thing (as smoke) ; hence, on your own shewing, the whole 

 topic of inference for oneselff would have to end in mere idle 

 words. 



Then again comparison, 1 ^. &c, must be utterly rejected as the means 

 of the knowledge of the universal proposition, since it is impossible that 

 they can produce the knowledge of the unconditioned connection (i. e. 

 the universal proposition), because their end is to produce the 

 knowledge of quite another connection, viz., the relation of a name 

 to something so named. 



Again, this same absence of a condition, § which has been given as 

 the definition of an invariable connection (&'. e. a universal proposi- 

 tion ;) can itself never be known ; since it is impossible to establish 

 that all conditions must be objections of perception, and therefore 

 although the absence of perceptible things may be itself perceptible, 

 the absence of non-perceptible things must be itself non-perceptible, 

 and thus, since we must here too have recourse to inference, &c, we 

 cannot leap over the obstacle which has already been planted to bar 

 them. Again, we must accept as the definition of the condition, "it is 

 that which is reciprocal or equipollent inextension|| with the majorterra, 



* See Sahitya Darpana (Dr. Ballantyne's trans, p. 16) and Siddhanta M. p. 80. 



t The properly logical, as distinguished from the rhetorical, argument. 



t " Upamdna or the knowledge of a similarity is the instrument in the pi'o- 

 duction of an inference from similarity. This particular inference consists in 

 the knowledge of the relation of a name to something so named," Dr. Ballan- 

 tyne's Tarka Sangraha. 



§ The upadhi is the condition which must be supplied to restrict a too general 

 middle term as in the inference ' the mountain has smoke because it has tire,' if 

 we add wet fuel as the condition of the fire, the middle term will be no longer too 

 general. In the case of a true vyapti there is of course no upadhi. 



11 A'vTio-TpeQei. We have here our own A with distributed predicate. 



3d 



