380 The Chdrvaka System of Philosophy. [No. 4 ? 



though not constantly accompanying the middle." These three dis- 

 tinguished clauses, "not constantly accompanying the middle term," 

 " constantly accompanying the major term," and " being constantly ac- 

 companied by it" (i. e. reciprocal), are needed in the full definition 

 to stop respectively three such fallacious conditions, in the argument 

 to prove the non-eternity of sound, as ' being produced,' ' the nature 

 of a jar,' and 'the not causing audition ;"* ^wherefore the definition 

 holds, — and again it is established by the s'loka of the great Doctor 

 beginning samdsama.f 



But since the knowledge of the condition must here precede the 

 knowledge of the condition's absence, it is only when there is the 

 knowledge of the condition, that the knowledge of the universality 

 of the proposition is possibie, i. e. a knowledge in the form of such a 

 connection between the middle term and major term as is distinguished 

 by the absence of any such condition ; and on the other hand the 

 knowledge of the condition depends upon the knowledge of the in- 



* If we omitted the first clause and only made the upadhi "that which 

 constantly accompanies the major term and is constantly accompanied by it," then 

 in the Naiyayik argument ' sound is non-eternal, because it lias the class of sound,' 

 ' being produced' would serve as a Mimansik upadhi, to establish the vyabJdchdra 

 fallacy, as it is reciprocal with ' non- eternal ;' but the omitted clause excludes it, 

 as an Upadhi must be consistent with either party's opinions, and of course the 

 Naiyayik maintains that ' being produced' always accompanies the class of sound. 

 Similarly if we defined the upaclhi as ' not constantly accompanying the middle 

 term and constantly accompanied by the major,' we might have as an upadhi ' the 

 nature of a jar,' as this is never found witli the middle term (the class or na- 

 ture of sound only residiug in sound', and that of a jar only in a jar,) while at the 

 same time wherever the class of jar is found there is also found non-eternity. 

 Lastly if we defined the upadhi as " not constantly accompanying the middle 

 term, and constantly accompanying the major," we might have as a Mimansik 

 upadhi ' the not causing audition' i. e. the not being apprehended by the organs of 

 hearing ; but this is excluded, as non-eternity is not always found where this is, 

 ether being inaudible and yet eternal. 



t This refers to an obscure s'loka of Udayanacharya, " where a reciprocal and 

 a non-reciprocal universal-connection (i. e. universal propositions which severally 

 do and do not distribute their predicates) relate to the same argument (as e. g. 

 to prove the existence of smoke,) there that non-reciprocating term of the second 

 will be a fallacious middle, which is not invariably accompanied by the other re- 

 procal of the first," Tims 'the mountain has smoke because it has fire' (here fire 

 and smoke are non-reciprocating, as fire is not found invariably accompanied by 

 smoke though smoke is by fire,) or ' because it has fire from wet fuel' (smoke and 

 fire from wet fuel being reciprocal and always accompanying each other) ; the non- 

 reciprocating term of the former (fire) will give a fallacious inference, because it is 

 also, of course, not invariably accompanied by the special kind of fire, that produced 

 from wet fuel. But this will not be the case, where the non-reciprocating term 

 is thus invariably accompanied by the other reciprocal, as ' the mountain has fire 

 because it has smoke ;' here though fire and smoke do not reciprocate, yet smoke 

 will be a true middle, because it is invariably accompanied by heat which is the 

 reciprocal of fire. 



