52 



CONCEPTION. 



CJoncep- case, time necessarily enters into eur conceptions. But 

 on - in thinking on the general laws of nature, and their va- 

 rious connections and relations, we never once think 

 of time, though a moment's reflection would convince 

 us that we are running over ideas which have already 

 been presented to the mind. 



Mr Stewart makes this distinction between concep- 

 tion and memory, that the former enables us to make 

 our past sensations and perceptions, objects of thought; 

 the latter recognises them as exact resemblances of 

 what has been already felt or perceived. We confess 

 that, in this instance, we cannot see the slightest 

 grounds for a distinction. Does not every act of me- 

 mory enable us to make our past sensations, or percep- 

 tions, objects of thought at the very moment that it re- 

 cognises them as old acquaintances ? Is it possible to 

 recollect any thing without having an idea of it ? We 

 take the word idea, in this sense, to be perfectly syno- 

 nymous with conception ; and we maintain that no other 

 power but that of recollection, or some modification of 

 memory, is necessary to give us the idea, or conception 

 of past sensations or perceptions. A man remembers 

 that he was hurt, that he felt pain, that he had a leg 

 amputated, that he was long in recovering ; in all this, 

 what use is there for the interposition of any other 

 power than memory to recal the idea of his misfor- 

 tune ? 



Conception is often confounded with imagination. 

 Mr Stewart has very properly stated the distinction : 

 he considers imagination to be that power which enables 

 us to combine the parts of different conceptions, so as 

 to form new wholes of our own creation. According to 

 our view of the subject, the distinction is still more 

 obvious. Conception, according to Mr Stewart, pre- 

 sents to the mind ideas already familiar to it ; which 

 we consider to be merely an act of memory, whose ob- 

 ject is to give a faithful copy of the past, and which, in 

 its simple exercise, is wholly uninfluenced by the will. 

 Imagination, on the contrary, is memory, under the 

 controul of the will, which, not satisfied with following 

 the order prescribed by nature, or suggested by acci- 

 dent, selects the parts of different conceptions or ob- 

 jects of memory, to form a whole, more pleasing, more 

 terrible, or more awful, than has ever been presented 

 by nature. When we wish to represent the terrible, 

 we seldom find in one object all the circumstances ne- 

 cessary to produce the full effect. We therefore bring 

 together all the circumstances of terror which our me- 

 mories can recollect, and we can conceive no other, in 

 order to deepen the horror and heighten the effect. 



We are aware that imagination is considered to de- 

 pend chiefly on the association of ideas. But we are 

 disposed to contend that even this associating principle, 

 to which such wonderful effects are ascribed, has no 

 claim whatever to be reckoned an original power of the 

 mind. We conceive it to be also a modification of me- 

 mory : and if it should be asked, how the recollection 

 of one event suggests all its relations, and produces an 

 unceasing flow of connected ideas, we answer, that it is 

 merely the memory recording what has been presented 

 to the mind, and running over that connected order, 

 which has been exhibited in the course of nature, or in 

 casual or artificial arrangements. Every event, and 

 every object, is either the natural or the artificial sign 

 of something connected with it ; and memory may be 

 called the recorded history of these relations. It places 

 before the mind what has been felt or perceived ; and 

 it is as natural for it to recollect the order, and other 

 circumstances under which objects were presented, as 



it is to recollect the objects themselves. And if we con- 

 sider how almost infinite these relations may become, 

 from time, or place, or circumstances, or feelings, we 

 may easily conceive how the memory may expatiate 

 over this boundless field, " and find no end in wander- 

 ing mazes lost." 



From the statement which we have given, it will ap- 

 pear, that we consider the ultimate principles of our 

 nature as much fewer than have usually been represent- 

 ed : and we fear it is a proof of the little progress which 

 has lately been made in the philosophy of mind, that 

 whilst those facts in physical science, which were for- 

 merly considered as ultimate, are daily diminishing in 

 number, in consequence of the extension of knowledge; 

 an opposite process has taken place in the science of 

 mind; and philosophers have shown a disposition to 

 multiply, unnecessarily, the original principles of our 

 nature. Every science is improved by the simplifica- 

 tion of its principles ; and this is an improvement which 

 has not as yet been introduced into pneumatology. 



The observations which have been made on this sub- 

 ject, are chiefly applicable to Mr Stewart's view of con- 

 ception, which he represents as an exact transcript of 

 past sensations or perceptions. But the term is used in 

 a much more extensive sense by Dr Keid, who con- 

 siders it as necessary in every operation of the mind. 

 " It may be observed," says he, " that conception en- 

 ters, as an ingredient, in every operation of the mind : 

 our senses cannot give us the belief of any object with- 

 out giving some conception of it at the same time." Intell. 

 Powers, p. ?58. So, then, to see an object with our 

 eyes, or to handle it with our hands, is not sufficient to 

 give us an idea of it : this mysterious power of concep- 

 tion must interpose, to introduce to the mind the ideas 

 communicated through the organs of sense. The senses 

 are the doors by which the visitors are admitted; con- 

 ception is the gentleman usher who introduces them to 

 the presence. Are we then to consider conception as 

 the connecting link between the senses and the mind ? 

 We must first see the shadow of a proof in support of 

 such an opinion. The senses are quite sufficient to do 

 their own office ; though the imperfection of philosophy 

 has been woefully exposed in attempting to explain the 

 manner in which they accomplish their end. 



Conception, considered as an original power of the 

 mind, must mean the power of forming conceptions, no- 

 tions, or ideas. Dr Reid himself confesses, that these 

 words are used synonymously, Intellect. Powers, chap. 1. 

 On the same principle, then, we mightsay, thatthepower 

 of forming ideas, is an original power of the mind. But 

 it is perfectly evident, that some of our ideas may be 

 traced to one simple faculty, whilst others result from 

 the combined operation of different powers : and is not 

 this the true origin of our conceptions, taking the word 

 in the extensive sense in which Dr Reid employs it ? 

 They can be traced to simple powers of the mind, or to 

 their combinations : and whatever idea, or conception, 

 arises from the exercise of one or more of our faculties, 

 is, ipso facto, presented to the mind, without requiring 

 the intervention of any power distinct from those in 

 which it originates. 



It has been assumed as a maxim in philosophy, that 

 whatever we can conceive is possible : but this has been 

 strenuously contested by Dr Reid, Intellect. Powers, p. 

 400. According to Mr Stewart's doctrine on concep- 

 tion, however, the proposition is self-evident. If it gives 

 us an exact transcript of what we have perceived or 

 felt, then, whatever we can conceive is possible ; for 

 its possibility has been demonstrated by its having ak 



Concep- 

 tion. 



