CON 



173 



CON 



dnecarpu 



> CONOCARPUS, a genus of plants of the class Pen- 

 tandria, and order Monogynia. See Botany, p. 155. 



CONOID, is the name of a solid, formed by the re- 

 volution of a conic section about its axis. Tims, if the 

 conic section is a parabola, the resulting solid is called 

 a paruuo'ic conoid, ov paraboloid ; if a hyperbola, a hy- 

 perbolic conoid, or hyperooloid ; if an ellipse, an elliptic 

 conoid, a spheroid, or an ellipsoid. (») 

 CONON. See Athens, vol. iii. p. 32. 

 CONOPS. See Entomology. 

 CONOSPERMUM, a genus of plants of the class 

 Tetrandria, and order Monogynia. See Botany, page 

 ISO ; and Brown's Prodromus Plant. Nov. Hull, ct Ins. 

 Van Diem. p. SG8. 



CONOSTYLIS, a genus of plants of the class, Ilex- 

 andria, and order Monogynia. See Botany, p. 196; 

 and Brown's Prodromus Plant. Nov. Iloll. &c. p. 300. 

 CONRAD I. II. III. IV. See Germany. 

 CONSANGUINITY. See Mahriage. 

 CONSCIENCE, is that principle, power, or faculty 

 within us, which decides on the merit or demerit of our 

 own actions, feelings, or affections. It has been called 

 the moral sense by Lord Shaftesbury and Dr Hutche- 

 son. This appellation has been objected to by some ; 

 but has been adopted and defended by Dr Reid, who 



are specious and plausible. But in our own case, the Conscience 

 uneasy feeling is heightened in a tenfold degree, be- 

 cause self-contempt and disgust are brought into coin- 

 petition with the warmest self-love, and the strongest 

 desire of self-approbation. We have then something or 

 the feelings of a parent, who knows the worthlessness of 

 the child he loves, and contemplates with horror the 

 shame and infamy which might arise from exposure to 

 the world. 



Conscience, then, cannot be considered as any tiling 

 else than the general principle of moral approbation or 

 disapprobation applied to our own feelings or conduct, 

 acting with increased energy, from the knowledge which 

 we have of our motives and actions, and from die deep 

 interest which we take in whatever concerns ourselves ; 

 and we do not think that they have deserved -well of 

 morals or philosophy, who have attempted to deduce 

 our notions of right and wrong from any one principle. 

 Various powers both of the understanding and of the 

 will, are concerned, in every moral conclusion ; and 

 even in those cases where we decide with instantaneous 

 promptitude, the decision is the result of a long induc- 

 tion, rendered familiar, and almost imperceptible, by 

 habit. 



We conceive, however, that the Author of our nature 



says, " the testimony of our moral faculty, like that of has furnished us with infallible principles of judging 

 the external senses, is the testimony of nature, and we concerning right and wrong, in giving us certain in- 

 have the same reason to rely upon it:" (Active Po?vcrs, p. stincts and feelings, and in establishing a certain order 

 2.) He considers conscience as an original faculty of and course of nature, to which these instincts and feel- 

 ings are adapted. When we sec any person acting in 

 direct opposition to the principles and feelings common 

 to human nature, or violating that order of things which 

 God has evidently appointee!, we are compelled to pro- 

 nounce that he is acting wrong; and were all our feel- 

 ings as simple as instincts, and our knowledge of the 

 order and constitution of things complete, we would 

 need no other rule of duty, but would be led, with in- 

 fallible certainty, to that line of conduct most condu- 

 cive to individual and public happiness. This, how- 

 ever, is far from being the case ; our feelings are irre- 

 gular and complex ; the designs of providence are not 

 always readily perceived; and a long induction of parti- 

 culars is frequently necessary, before we can pronounce, 

 v/ith confidence, respecting the merit or demerit of cer- 

 tain actions. With regard to some, indeed) the light of 

 nature can never lead us to a satisfactory conclusion. 

 From this view of the subject, it is evident that a train 

 of reasoning is either actually employed, or impercep- 

 tibly implied in every moral decision ; and conscience 

 seems to be nothing else than reasoning applied to mo- 



.) He considers conscience as an original faculty of 

 our nature, which decides clearly, authoritatively, and 

 instantaneously, on every object that falls within its pro- 

 vince. " As Ave rely," says he, " upon the clear and 

 distinct testimony of our eyes, concerning the colours 

 and figures of the bodies about us, we have the same rea- 

 son to rely, with security, upon the clear and unbiassed 

 testimony of our conscience, with regard to what we 

 ought and ought not to do." 



Without, in the slightest degree, questioning the uti- 

 lity and authoritative influence of conscience, we must 

 be allowed to think, that Dr Reid is unfortunate in il- 

 lustrating its power by the analogy of the external sen- 

 ses. With regard to the intimations received through 

 the organs of sense, there can be no difference of opi- 

 nion, and there can be no room for argument. They 

 give us at once correct information, which reasoning 

 can neither invalidate nor confirm. But it is surely 

 impossible to say as much for the power of conscience, 

 Which sometimes gives the most opposite intimations 

 with regard to the simplest moral facts, and which re- 

 quires to be corrected by an accurate attention to the 



established order of nature, or to the known will of rals, with a particukr reference to our mra interests "and 

 Oocl, before we can rely with confidence on its decisions, feelings. 



It does not appear, that conscience can with propri- 

 ety be considered as a principle distinct from that which 

 enables us to pronounce on the general merit or demerit 

 of moral actions. This principle, or faculty, is attend- 

 ed with peculiar feelings, when we ourselves are the 

 agents : we are then too deeply interested to view the 

 matter as a mere subject of reasoning ; and pleasure or 

 pain are excited, with a degree of intensity proportioned 

 to the importance which we always assign to our own 

 interests and feelings. In the case of others, our appro- 

 bation or disapprobation are generally qualified, some- 

 times suspended, by our ignorance of the motives by 

 which they have been influenced ; but, in our own case, 

 the motives and the actions .are both before us, and 



In this view, it will appear that the common lan- 

 guage on the subject is pretty correct, and that con- 

 science^ may, with sufficient propriety, be called the 

 voice of God, as it proclaims his will, after it has beei* 

 ascertained by a reference to the constitution of our na- 

 ture, to the economy of providence, or to the light of re- 

 velation. 



Conscience often acquires a powerful mechanical in- 

 fluence from habit, and frequently inflicts great uneasi- 



ally in the presence of God, and accountable' to him for 

 all our thoughts, words, and actions. A conscience 



wlicn tl,m, ^„ «„t „„„ i j> i.i \ " ,uu s" M ) wuiuo, iiuu actions. i\ conscience 



w ith r Z£ , correspond we feel the same disgust well-informed, and possessed of sensibility, is the best 



security for virtue, and the most awful avenger of wic- 

 " conscience^ is the most power- 

 o 



whose motives we knew to be vicious, whilst bjs actions ked deeds; an. ill-informed 



