CON 



174 



CON 



Conscious- 



nesf. 



fill instrument of mischief; a squeamish and ticklish 

 conscience, generally renders those who are under its 

 influence contemptible and ridiculous. 



Ilic mitrus ahencus csto, 



SVil cnnscire sibi, nulla pallescere culpa. 



(g) 



CONSCIOUSNESS, denotes "the immediate know- 

 ledge which the mind has of its sensations and thoughts, 

 .aid, in general, of all its present operations." 



Such is the definition given by Mr Stewart in his 

 Outlines of Moral Philosophy, and generally adopted 

 by modern writers on pneumatology, who limit the 

 word to the present operations of the mind, and find 

 fault with Mr Locke, who talks of the consciousness of 

 past feelings and actions. " Of all the present opera- 

 tions of the mind," says Mr Stewart, " consciousness is 

 an inseparable concomitant." 



There does not appear to be much reason for this re- 

 striction : for certainly consciousness is also an insepa- 

 rable concomitant of all mental operations which are the 

 objects of memory. The remembrance of past thoughts 

 and sensations, if unaccompanied by consciousness, 

 would be viewed in the same light as the recorded jour- 

 nal of another's sentiments and feelings ; and we would 

 consider ourselves as no more accountable for them 

 than for those which we meet in the records of history. 

 The memory retains past thoughts and sensations ; con- 

 sciousness stamps them as our unalienable property. 



But is it certain that consciousness accompanies all 

 the present operations of the mind? Does the mind never 

 act, on any occasion, but when we are sensible of it ? 

 Would it not be more correct to say, that conscious- 

 ness necessarily accompanies all the sensible operations 

 of the mind, whether they relate to present or past 

 thoughts or sensations ? In fact, consciousness seems to 

 be that peculiar quality which constitutes animality ; 

 which enables animals to perceive and feel, and distin- 

 guishes them from those beings which are destitute of 

 life, and organization. Without it, we would have no 

 evidence that the mind thinks at all, and we could have 

 no perception of external objects. 



The belief with which consciousness is attended, has 

 been considered as the most irresistible cf any ; inso- 

 much that this species of evidence has never been ques- 

 tioned : and yet, as Mr Stewart well observes, it rests 

 on the same foundation with every other kind of belief 

 to which w T e are determined by the constitution of our 

 nature. 



There seems to be no good reason for distinguishing the 

 belief arising from consciousness, from the other kinds 

 of belief which necessarily result from the constitution 

 of our nature. Consciousness attends every species of 

 belief, and every feeling of the mind ; is in itself per- 

 fectly passive, merely reporting what is felt, and giving 

 notice of the impressions received through the medium 

 of the senses and the faculties. 



" We cannot properly be said," says Mr Stewart, 

 •- to be conscious of our own existence; our knowledge 

 of this fact being necessarily posterior, in the order of 

 time, to the consciousness of those sensations by which 

 it is suggested." 



Now, with due deference to such great authority, we 

 are inclined to think, that the consciousness of our sen- 

 sations and the consciousness of our existence are si- 

 multaneous ; that we cannot be conscious of feeling 

 without being conscious of existence. The knowledge 

 of our existence is surely not a matter of reasoning ; it 

 is forced upon us irresistibly ; when we know we feel, 

 «e know we exist; and if any man is disposed to doubt 



his existence, we should think it very idle to attempt to Consecra- 

 convince him. Des Cartes removed his doubts on this tion - 

 important subject, by the famous maxim, cogilo ergo "^ "Y"™' 

 sum ; if he meant to say, that a thinking being neces- 

 sarily exists, the argument is extremely absurd, as it 

 assumes the thing to be proved : but if he meant to af- 

 firm that the knowledge of our sensations, and the 

 knowledge of our existence, are simultaneous and iden- 

 tical, we conceive that he is perfectly right ; and that 

 the consciousness of thought and feeling, gives an in- 

 stantaneous, irresistible evidence of existence. 



Mr Locke conceived that we derived our notion of 

 personal identity from consciousness alone; it is from 

 consciousness and memory that we acquire this idea. 

 See Logic and Metaphysics, (g) 



CONSECRATION, is the act of solemnly devoting, 

 or setting apart, certain persons, places, and things, to 

 religious duties or purposes. This act, though it has 

 frequently been accompanied with superstitious, absurd, 

 and even impure rites, has its foundation in a principle 

 of reverence for the Deity, and a conviction of the pro- 

 priety of embodying that reverence in suitable expres- 

 sions of outward devotion. Among every people, ac- 

 coixlingly, however remote from each other, and how- 

 ever dissimilar in character or worship, the obligation of 

 such acts has been felt and recognised. So strong, in- 

 deed, is this principle, and so universally does it ope- 

 rate, that, not to mention the Jews, who were divinely 

 commanded to count their first born, whether of men 

 or of cattle, and the first fruits of the earth, sacred to 

 Jehovah; the Greeks, Romans, Egyptians, Persians, 

 Hindoos, and all other heathen nations, have uniformly 

 considered particular persons, animals, plants, rivers, 

 mountains, groves, or caverns, &c. as naturally conse- 

 crated to the service or residence of particular deities. 

 But besides this natural consecration, as it may not im- 

 properly be termed, the consecration of individual per- 

 sons, places, and tilings, has formed an important part 

 of worship under almost every form of religion, and has 

 been attended with peculiar solemnities and ceremonies. 

 To some of these we shall now shortly advert. 



The consecration of Aaron and his sons to the priest- 

 ly office, began with an ablution of water, by which 

 they were ceremonially purified; they were then a- 

 nointed with precious oil, compounded of various costly 

 and fragrant spices ; after which they were clothed in 

 the sacerdotal robes. These were eight; four common 

 to all the priests, and four peculiar to the high-priest. 

 The former were the linen drawers, the coat, the gir- 

 dle, and the turban, all of which, especially in the case 

 of the high-priest, were richly embroidered and adorn- 

 ed with jewels. The latter wore the robe of a blue 

 colour, splendidly fringed, and ornamented with gol- 

 den bells ; the ephod, or short cloak, on the shoulders, 

 fastened by two buttons of onyx or emerald, having the 

 names of the twelve tribes engraven on them ; the gir- 

 dle, on which were the " breast-plate of judgment," 

 studded with four rows of jewels set in gold, and the 

 Urim and Thummim, with the names of the 12 pa- 

 triarchs graven on it also ; and, lastly, the holy crown 

 of gold, having this inscription, " Holiness unto the 

 Lord." The ceremony was concluded by the sacrifice 

 of several animals, some of the blood of which was 

 sprinkled on the tip of the right ear, the thumb of the 

 right hand, and the great toe of the right foot of the 

 priests who were consecrated, certain parts of the sacri- 

 fices being at the same time put into their hands. 

 From this last circumstance, the consecration of the 

 ordinary priests was said to be " by fitting the hand". 



