CULLODEN. 



491 



gullodca. bank with a considerable force, and seemingly pre- 

 "— ~r"** pared to resist their passage. Upon observing this, 

 the Duke of Cumberland, for greater security, and 

 for better effectuating his purpose, immediately form- 

 ed his army into three divisions, and crossed the 

 river at three places, about half a mile distant from 

 each other. The Duke of Perth, howevei-, without 

 waiting to oppose any of the divisions, upon seeing the 

 king's troops approach the river, instantly drew off his 

 men, in obedience to private instructions, and retreat- 

 ed westward to join Charles in the neighbourhood of 

 Inverness. The main body of the royalists followed 

 them leisurely ; but some companies of grenadiers, with 

 some light horse, and a few Argyleshiremen, who were 

 more active in the pursuit, overtook their rear before 

 it had quitted the town of Nairn, and a slight skirmish 

 ensued. The rebels, however, still continued their re- 

 treat, closely followed by this detachment of the king's 

 troops, and were upon the point of having a more se- 

 rious rencounter with them at a place called the Loch 

 of Clans, about five miles west from Nairn, when Charles 

 unexpectedly arrived with some troops to their assist- 

 ance ; upon which the pursuers were in their turn com- 

 pelled to retreat, and join the main body of their army, 

 which encamped the same evening on a plain to the 

 west of Nairn. It appears that Charles, upon recei- 

 ving intelligence of the near approach of the Duke of 

 Cumberland, had that morning left Inverness with part 

 of his troops, and had ordered the rest to follow him 

 to Culloden-moor, where he intended to offer battle to 

 his enemies. 



This resolution of the young prince must appear 

 altogether rash and unaccountable, whether we con- 

 sider the state of his army, weakened by the absence 

 of numerous detachments employed in the service 

 formerly alluded to ; or the situation of the place, 

 which was drawing him away from his resources ; or 

 the nature of the ground, which is peculiarly favour- 

 able for the operations of regular troops ; or, above all, 

 the happy opportunity which he had already deliberate- 

 ly lost, of opposing them at the passage of a rapid ri- 

 ver. But whatever might be his motives, certain it is, 

 that next morning he drew out his forces on Culloden- 

 moor, in the expectation that the Duke of Cumberland 

 would leave Nairn that day to meet him. After wait- 

 ing till past noon, and no enemy appearing, it occur- 

 red to him that the royal army might be engaged in 

 celebrating the Dukes birth-day, and consequently 

 would not begin their march till the following morn- 

 ing. He accordingly ordered the men to quarters, and 

 instantly summoned a council of his officers. At this 

 meeting, after considerable difference of opinion, it 

 was determined to make a night-attack upon the Duke's 

 camp at Nairn. 



This scheme, which in its details was extremely 

 plausible, seemed to be still more advisable from a con- 

 sideration of the temporary relaxation of discipline, 

 which, it was probable, would exist in the king's ar- 

 my in consequence of the festivity of the preceding 

 day. This plan, however, so specious in itself, and so 

 opportunely devised, failed completely in the execu- 

 tion, and placed the rebels in far worse circumstances 

 than they were previous to the attempt. 



This failure was partly owing to that general insub- 

 ordination common to all irregular troops, and which 

 had always prevailed to a great extent in the rebel ar- 

 my, but which was, on the present occasion, greatly 

 increased by the hardships which they suffered from 

 want of pay, and regular supplies of every kind ; 



partly to the length of the march, and the short time Culloden. 

 which could be allowed for performing it ; and partly *■""%'""""'' 

 to the extreme darkness. of the night, and the necessity 

 they were under of leaving the common road, in or- 

 der to avoid the houses which lay in their way. The 

 result of all which was a considerable loss of time in 

 commencing the march, and a still greater difficulty in 

 getting on, after the line was put in motion, occasion- 

 ed by the weakness of some, the desertion of others, 

 the badness of the roads, and the want of unanimity 

 among the chiefs themselves, respecting the expedien- 

 cy of the measure itself. In such circumstances, failure 

 was quite inevitable. While they were yet three miles 

 from Nairn, two o'clock, the hour of the proposed at- 

 tack, was past. The near approach of dawn, and the 

 beating of a drum in the enemy's camp, now convin- 

 ced the most sanguine that the project ought to be aban- 

 doned, or, at least, that surprise was impossible. No- 

 thing remained, therefore, but to retreat to Culloden ; 

 which they did without the least molestation on the 

 part of the enemy, and in much shorter time than they 

 advanced. 



Whether this scheme of a night attack would have 

 ultimately succeeded, even if these obvious causes of 

 failure had not occurred, is extremely doubtful ; for we 

 find, that the Duke of Cumberland, though ignorant of 

 the details of the plan, especially of that part of it which 

 consisted in attacking him on the south side, was com- 

 pletely informed, by means of spies, of the approach of 

 the rebels, and had made preparations accordingly. 

 Upon hearing, therefore, of their retreat, he drew out 

 his army at break of day, and advanced westward in 

 pursuit of them. The rebels, oppressed with hunger 

 and fatigue, had reached Culloden nearly about the 

 time the Duke began to move from Nairn. But so 

 distressful was their condition, and so overpowering 

 the calls of nature, that, in spite of their perilous situa- 

 tion with regard to the enemy, they no sooner arrived 

 at their former ground, than they immediately disper- 

 sed in different directions, — some fainting with fatigue, 

 lay down on the heath to rest themselves, others betook 

 themselves to the Avoods, others to the villages around 

 in quest of food, and some went even so far as In- 

 verness for the same purpose. While his troops were 

 in this state of disorder and inefficiency, news was 

 brought to Charles at Culloden-house, that the Duke's 

 army was in full march towards him. There seemed 

 to be now no alternative but to fight, even in his pre- 

 sent unfavourable circumstances, or to give up the 

 cause as lost. Charles chose the. former. Having ral- 

 lied his troops in the best manner possible, he drew 

 them up on the moor, about a mile and a half south 

 from Culloden-house. The arrangements for battle were 

 made by Sullivan, quarter-master-general, in the fol- 

 lowing order : He formed the whole, with the excep- 

 tion of a small body of reserve, into two lines; the first 

 consisting of eleven, and the second of nine regiments. 

 The Athol regiment occupied the right of the first line; 

 and on their left, in regular succession, were formed 

 the Camerons, the Appins, the Frasers, the Macin- 

 toshes, the united regiment of Maclauchlans and Mac- 

 leans, Roy Stewart's regiment, Farquharson's, and the 

 three Macdonald regiments, viz. Clanranald, Keppoch, 

 and Glengary. The second line was composed of the 

 following regiments, viz. two battalions of Lord Ogil- 

 vie's regiment on the right ; and to their left, two bat- 

 talions of Lord Lewis Gordon's regiment, two batta- 

 lions of Glenbuckets, the Duke of Perth's regiment. 

 Lord John Drummond's regiment, and two regiments 



