1836.] Authorities on Buddhism. 79 



archetypally embodied sentient principle comes to exercise itself on 

 these properties of things, then definite perception or knowledge is 

 produced, as that this is white, the other, black ; this is right, the 

 other wrong, (sixth Karma.) Thence arises desire or worldly affection 

 in the archetypal body, (seventh Karma,) which leads to corporeal 

 conception, (eighth,) and that to physical birth, (ninth.) From birth 

 result the varieties of genus and species distinguishing animated nature, 

 (tenth Karma,) and thence come decay and death in the time and 

 manner peculiar to each, (eleventh and final Karma.) Such is the evolu- 

 tion of all things in Pravritti ; opposed to which is Nirvritti, and the 



Rasa, Sparsa, Dharma. There is an obvious difficulty as to Sparsa, and some 

 also as to Dharma. Tlie whole category of the Ayatans expresses outward things : 

 and after much investigation, I gather, that under Rupa is comprised not only 

 colour, but form too, so far as its discrimination (or, in Kdrmika terms, its 

 existence) depends on sight; and that all other zwspecified properties of body 

 are referred to Sparsa, which therefore includes not only temperature, roughness, 

 and smoothness, and hardness, and its opposite, but also gravity, and even extend- 

 ed figure, though not extension in the abstract. 



Here we have not merely the secondary or sensible properties of matter, but 

 also the primary ones ; and, as the existence of the Ayatans or outward objects 

 perceived, is said to be derived from the Indriyds, (or from M&nas, which is their 

 collective energy,) in other words, to be derived from the sheer exercise of the 

 percipient powers. Nor is there any difficulty thence arising in reference to the 

 Kdrmika doctrine, which clearly affirms that theory by its derivation of all things 

 from Pratyaya (belief), or from Avidya (ignorance). But the Indriyds and 

 Ayatans, with their necessary connexion, (and, possibly, also, the making Avidya 

 the source of all things,) belong likewise to one section at least of the Swabhd- 

 vika school ; aud, in regard to it, it will require a nice hand to exhibit this 

 Berkleyan notion existing co-ordinately with the leading tenet of the Swabhdvikas. 

 In the way of explanation I may observe, first, that the denial of material entity 

 involved in the Indriyd and Ayatdn theory (as in that of Avidya) respects solely 

 the versatile world of Pravritti, or of specific forms merely, and does not touch 

 the Nirvrittikd state of formative powers and of primal substances, to which 

 latter, in that condition, the qualities of gravity, and even of extended figure, in 

 any sense cognizable by human faculties, are denied, at the same time, that the 

 real and even eternal existence of those substances, in that state, is affirmed. 



Second, though Dharma, the sixth Ayatdn, be rendered by virtue, the appro- 

 priated object of the internal sense, it must be remembered, that most of the 

 Swabhdvikas, whilst they deny a moral ruler of the universe, affirm the existence 

 of morality as a part of the system of nature. Others again (the minority) of 

 the Swabhdvikas reject the sixth Indriya, and sixth Ayatdn, and, with them, the 

 sixth Dhydni Buddha, or Vajrd Satwa, who, by the way, is the Magnus Apollo 

 of the Tdntrikds, a sect the mystic and obscene character of whose ritual is 

 redeemed by its unusually explicit enunciation and acknowledgment of a " God 

 above all." 



The published explanations of the procession of all things from Avidya appear 

 to me irreconcilably to conflict with the ideal basis of the theory. 

 M 2 



