CHANCE. 



193 



a " principle of perfectibility " inherent in organisms 

 (Nageli), of the " divine breath as the inward impulse 

 in the evolutionary history of nature " (Braun), of 

 " tendency to perfectibility " implanted by the Creator 

 (R. Owen), even of the " striving towards the purpose " 

 (v. Baer), can chance be supposed to have produced 

 these marvellous higher organizations? To this it may 

 be plainly answered, that this chance, to which purbhnd 

 humanity allots so great a part wherever the personal 

 interference of a superior Being or the universal " crea- 

 tive and productive principle " is not at hand, has no 

 existence in nature, and that our conviction of the truth 

 of the doctrine of derivation is due to its adjustment 

 of the phenomenal series as causes and effects. Let 

 us remember, and fancy ourselves in possession of, the 

 formula of the universe of Laplace, by the aid of which 

 all future evolutions might be computed in advance. 

 With our limited powers, it is true, it is retrospectively 

 alone that certainty can be approached in the calcu- 

 lation and discrimination of the series. In this we must 

 obliterate the word chance, for causality, as we under- 

 stand it, makes chance entirely superfluous. Any one 

 who transports himself to the commencement of an evo- 

 lution, who, for instance, fancies himself present at 

 the genesis of the reptiles, may, from his antediluvian 

 observatory, look upon the development of the reptile 

 into the bird as a " chance," if he does not peradventure 

 regard it as predestined. To us, who trace the bird 

 backwards to its origin, it seetns the result of mechanical 

 causes. 



Let us now recapitulate what we have gained by 

 the doctrine of Descent, based pn the theory of selec- 



