328 Habit and Instinct. 



lower animals; " and with Komanes,* that "instinct plays 

 a larger part in the psychology of many animals than it 

 does in the psychology of man." If, on the other hand, 

 a broader definition of instinct be accepted, so as to in- 

 clude what is innate, in the sense before defined, we shall 

 agree with Prof. Wundt f that human life is " permeated 

 through and through with instinctive action, determined 

 in part, however, by intelligence and volition; " and shall 

 not profoundly disagree with Prof. Wm. James,$ who says 

 that " man possesses all the impulses that they (the lower 

 creatures) have, and a great many more besides." The higher 

 animals have, he continues, a number of impulses, such as 

 greediness and suspicion, curiosity and timidity, all of 

 them " congenital, blind at first, and productive of motor 

 reactions of a rigorously determinate sort. Each of them, 

 then, is an instinct, as instincts are commonly defined. 

 But they contradict each other — ' experience ' in each 

 particular opportunity of application usually deciding the 

 issue. The animal that exhibits them loses the ' instinc- 

 tive ' demeanour, and appears to lead a life of hesitation 

 and choice, an intellectual life ; not, however, because he 

 has no instincts — rather because he has so many that 

 they block each other's path." This theory of the equi- 

 libration of instinctive tendencies is, no doubt, ingenious. 

 But there is an old adage — de non a'pjyarcntibxis et non 

 existentibus eadem esP ratio. And in any case, according to 

 the method of interpretation we have adopted, activities, 

 congenitally definite, must be objectively manifested, as 

 such, if they are to make good their claim to the 

 instinctive class. 



What, then, in the narrower acceptation of the term, 



* " Mental Evolution in Man," p. 8. 



t " Lectures on Human and Animal Psychology,'' p. 397. 



+ " Principles of Psychology," vol. ii. pp. 392, 393. 



