INSTINCT NOT DUB TO VOLITION 87 



applied to those instincts wliich take place but once in the indi- 

 vidual lifetime, in which, therefore, there can be no question of 

 habit ; nor to those instincts which occur among the sterile 

 worker bees and worker ants, in which there can be no trans- 

 mission. In the same way, when Ribot adds (p. 19), " A mesure 

 que les divers etats physiolgiques, d'abord accompagnes de con- 

 science, sont devenus plus rapides, mieux coordonnes, la con- 

 science s'est retiree d'eux, en sorte que ce mecanisme si regulier 

 ne represente plus aujourd'hui que de la conscience eteinte," it 

 is somewhat difficult to see how this can be applied to certain 

 cases in which the necessary degree of intelligence is lacking ; 

 and in which the elaboration of an act of volition would, under 

 the circumstances, take too long for the individual to escape 

 destruction. For instance, let us take the case of a butterfly 

 whose instinct causes it to fly upwards and in the opposite 

 direction when the shadow of an approaching object stimulates 

 its nervous mechanism. It is impossible for the butterfly to 

 know what death is, for it has never experienced it, and it pos- 

 sesses no reasoning powers capable of replacing personal experi- 

 ence. It is likewise impossible for the butterfly to develop an 

 act of vohtion in such a brief but critical moment. Conscious- 

 ness and vohtion presuppose, when combined, reflection ; and 

 if the butterfly, supposing it to be capable of so doing, had first 

 of all to reflect, to estabHsh a correlation between the approach- 

 ing object and the phenomenon of death, and then, as a result 

 of such reflection, to wHZ the act of flying away ; it is more than 

 probable that the object in question would have pounced upon 

 it before this relatively elaborate psychical process had been 

 completed. To suppose consciousness at the basis of the instinct 

 of the butterfly to fly from an approaching object, is to assume 

 the butterfly in possession of a knowledge of causahty sufficient 

 for it to be able to establish a correlation between the approach- 

 ing object and danger for itself ; this is assuredly giving the 

 butterfly credit for more intelhgence than it possesses. 



