NOTE ON EUROPEAN CONFLICTS 411 



as being dominated by the desire of Continental hegemony ; and, indeed, 

 this spectre of German domination on the Continent of Europe haunts 

 the minds of most Enghshmen to such an extent that the idea of an Anglo- 

 Russian alliance is fast becoming familiar. But, lest we be misimderstood, 

 it is, perhaps, as well if we explain our meaning a httle more fully. 



The situation in Europe can be understood only if the nature of the 

 developmental forces working out the evolution of the European peoples 

 are properly grasped. One great fact dominates all the others— the 

 struggle between the Slav and Germanic races for supremacy in Europe. 

 AH minor developments are but incidental occurrences of only temporary 

 moment. The policy of Germany since 1871 has been shaped in view of 

 this ultimate contingency ; the efforts of German statesmen to secure the 

 predominance of Germany in Europe have aU had the same reason — the 

 necessity of opposing a strong and extended Germany to the advance of 

 the Slav. Whether it be the result of reasoning or instinct, certain it is 

 that the German people have been able to appreciate the reality of the 

 situation. They have understood that Russia wiU not, and cannot, 

 remain eternally confined within her present boundaries ; that there is 

 an unknown and enormous reserve of strength and energy in the Russian 

 Colossus ; that the Pan-Slav agitation, with its dreams of universal con- 

 quest, does but anticipate a racial demand. They have seen Russia advance, 

 slowly and steadily, in the Ear East, in Persia, towards the Dardanelles ; 

 they have witnessed the revival of separatist agitation in Prussian and 

 Austrian Poland ; and now they contemplate the gradual awakening of 

 120,000,000 Russians who hve between the White and the Black Seas, 

 between the Urals and the Vistula. Having this perpetual menace before 

 them, German statesmen have sought to prepare the German people for 

 a struggle which they know to be inevitable. The struggle wiU be, not 

 only between Russian and German, but between Slav and Teuton ; and 

 Germany wiU be — as is only natural — the Continental centre of a con- 

 federation of the Germanic peoples which will embrace German Austria, 

 German Switzerland, Scandinavia, Denmark, Holland ; and which ought 

 certainly to embrace Great Britain. 



We maintain, therefore, that any efforts which have been made to secure 

 the Continental predominance of Germany were not contrary to England's 

 interest ; but that such efforts should have been seconded by England, 

 in view of the ultimate contingency of a conflict between the Slav and 

 Germanic races. 



Even as hostility to Germany appears contrary to England's interest, 

 so does an alliance with France appear to be based on a very short-sighted 

 appreciation of facts ; and far more does the project of an Anglo-Russian 

 alliance seem, aUke from an English and from a Russian point of view, 

 entirely senseless. The importance attributed to-day to the action of 



