36 DARWINIAN AND SPENCERIAN 



general principle of Evolution to this, that, or the other 

 set of phenomena cannot be challenged on the ground of 

 unscientific method, but can only be judged by the same 

 standard as that by which we judge other scientific con- 

 clusions — ^the evidence submitted, or rather the weight 

 assignable, to the evidence. 



The deductive method in physical science has never been 

 challenged: the more highly developed the science, the 

 more freely is the deductive method employed : — 



' The successful process of scientific inquiry demands 

 continually the alternate use of both the inductive and 

 deductive method. The path by which we rise to know- 

 ledge must be made smooth and beaten in its lower steps, 

 and often ascended and descended, before we can scale our 

 way to any eminence, much less climb to the summit. 

 The achievement is too great for a single effort ; stations 

 must be estabhshed, and communications kept open with 

 all below.' ^ 



If, therefore, the Spencerian treatment of Evolution 

 commanded less confidence among scientific men than 

 the more concrete method of Darwin, some other explana- 

 tion must be found than the violation by the author of 

 the Synthetic Philosophy of the recognized principles of 

 the scientific method. The reasons are not difficult to 

 produce ; how far these reasons were or are valid must 

 be left to posterity to decide. 



In the first place the man of science, by virtue of his 

 training, is alone capable of realizing the difficulties — 

 often enormous — of getting accurate data for induction. 



* Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy, 1831 

 p. 175. See also George Henry Lewes, Science and Speculation, chap, ii, 

 § 24 : ' The distinguishing characteristic of Science is its method of 

 graduated Verification and not, as some think, the employment of Induc- 

 tion in lieu of Deduction. All science is deductive, and deductive in pro- 

 portion to its separation from ordinary knowledge and its co-ordination 

 into system. The true antithesis is not between Induction and Deduc- 

 tion, but between verified and unverified cases of Induction and 

 Deduction.' It is obvious that as soon as we attempt to verify an 

 Induction we are using it deductively, and are thereby investing it 

 with philosophic rank as being worthy of sufi&cient credence to con- 

 sider it necessary to confront it with reality. 



