INTRODUCTION 21 



not merely of motion but also of sensibility and of 

 thought. That these same units should aflford not 

 merely the apparently unconscious properties of 

 matter, but likewise what we know them to possess, 

 its conscious functions too. 



This is equivalent to the theory of matter which 

 the late Professor Clifford designated as mind-stuff, 

 that endows matter with the properties by which in 

 certain of its states it can also manifest itself as Mind. 

 If such aggregates in constituting a brain and nervous 

 system can become self-conscious, the universe itself 

 may, for anything we know now, be a still more 

 complex aggregate and self-conscious too. This will 

 involve the difficulty of selves within selves, a 

 difficulty which we shall have to face and consider 

 before entertaining the idea of a self-conscious world. 



There is no necessary discontinuity between the 

 animate and inanimate Nature as we have grown 

 accustomed to regard it. This point is mentioned at 

 the outset lest pious fears should be raised that the 

 results of this work might be interpreted as destroying 

 the foundations of Eeligion and of Morality. Eather 

 do they tend, if our views be true, to break down the 

 barrier between Religion and Irreligion and to show 

 the continuity of Nature and of Mind as one 

 harmonious and consistent whole. 



We are not entering, nor should we care to enter, 

 upon abstruse questions of metaphysics ; but the 

 Natural philosopher must be lopsided indeed, as we 

 fear many such philosophers have been, when they 

 attribute to matter the absence of any of the most 



