p. 9. 



THE PRODROMUS 213 



place, one must confess that all the rest werp produced by the 

 same force. And so J saw the matter finally brought to the 

 point that any given solid naturally contained within a solid 

 must be examined in order to ascertain whether it was produced 

 in the same place in which it is found ; that is, the character 

 not only of the place where it is found, but also of the place 

 where it was produced, must be investigated. But no one, in 

 truth, will easily determine the place of production who does 

 not know the manner of production, and all discussion concern- 

 ing the manner of production is idle unless we gain some cer- 

 tain knowledge concerning the nature of matter. From this it 

 is clear how many questions must be solved in order that a 

 single question may be set at rest. c 



The second cause, the nurse of doubts, seems to me to be 

 the fact that in the consideration of questions relating to nature 

 those points which cannot be definitely determined, are not 

 distinguished from those which can be settled with certainty. 

 And the result is that the leading schools of philosophers are 

 reduced to two classes. Some religiously refrain from putting 

 credence even in demonstrations, out of fear that there be lurk- 

 ing in them the error which they have often found in other 

 asserted truths. Others, on the contrary, would by no means 

 allow themselves to be bound to consider as certain only those 

 matters to which no one of sound mind and sound senses 

 could deny credence, but believe that all things are true which 

 have seemed to themselves fine and clever. Nay, the very 

 advocates of experiment have rarely had sufficient self-control 

 to refrain either from casting aside even most certain funda- 

 mental facts of nature, or from considering the fundamental 

 facts discovered by themselves as proved. In order that I 

 might, therefore, avoid ^ this rock also, I decided that in the 

 sciences of nature we must enforce the principle which Seneca ^ 



1 In the Florentine edition of 1669, evitare is an obvious misprint for evitarem. 



2 Seneca nowliere, so far as I know, gives expression to the first part of Steno's sentence. 

 But the language of the last part is identical with that oi Epistles, 29. 11 : ex omni domo con- 

 clamabunt, Peripatetici, Academid, Stoici, Cynici. The only point of difference is that Seneca 

 has the future tense, conclamabunt, where Steno has the present, conclamant. The first part 

 of Seneca's sentence does indeed mention 'the people,' but scarcely in a manner apropos of 

 Steno's argument. Epicurus is represented as saying : ' I never wished to please the people. 

 For the people does not approve what I know, and what the people approves, I do not knovv.' 

 Steno may have been thinking oi de Beneficiis, I. 11, i, where benefits are classified as neces- 



