76 THE DESCENT OP MAN. 



she then, though never before known to ruffle a feather, 

 deliberately killed one, brought over the other, and returned 

 for the dead bird. Col. Hutchinson relates that two partridges 

 were shot at once, one being killed, the other wounded; the 

 latter ran away, and was caught by the retriever, who on her 

 return came across the dead bird; "she stopped, evidently 

 "greatly puzzled, and after one or two trials, finding she could 

 "not take it up without permitting the escape of the winged 

 "bird, she considered a moment, then deliberately murdered it 

 "by giving it a severe crunch, and afterwards brought away 

 "both together. This was the only known instance of her 

 "ever having willfully injured any game." Here we have reason 

 though not quite perfect, for the retriever might have brought 

 the wounded bird first and then returned for the dead one, as in 

 the case of the two wild-ducks. I give the above cases, as resting 

 on the evidence of two independent witnesses, and because in both 

 instances the retrievers, after deliberation, broke through a habit 

 which is inherited by them (that of not killing the game re- 

 trieved), and because they show how strong their reasoning fac- 

 ulty must have been to overcome a fixed habit. 



I will conclude by quoting a remark by the illustrious Hum- 

 boldt.=' "The muleteers in S. America say, 'I will not give 

 " 'you the mule whose step is easiest, but la mas racional, — the 

 " 'one that reasons best;' " and as he adds, "this popular expres- 

 "sion, dictated by long experience, combats the system of ani- 

 "mated machines, better perhaps than all the arguments of specu- 

 "lative philosophy." Nevertheless some writers even yet deny 

 that the higher animals possess a trace of reason; and they en- 

 deavor to explain away, by what appears to be mere verbiage,^ 

 all such facts as those above given. 



It has, I think, now been shown that man and the higher ani- 

 mals, especially the Primates, have some few instincts in common. 

 All have the same senses, intuitions, and sensations, — similar 

 passions, affections, and emotions, even the more complex ones, 

 such as jealousy, suspicion, emulation, gratitude, and magnanim- 



28 'Personal Narrative," Eng-. translat. vol. iii. p. 106. 



^ I am g-lad to find that so acute a reasoner as Mr. Leslie Stephen 

 ('Darwinism and Divinity, Essays on Pree-thinlting,' 1873, p. 80), in 

 spealcing- of the supposed impassable barrier between the minds ol man 

 and the lower animals, says, "The distinctions, indeed, which have 

 "been drawn, seem to us to rest upon no better foundation than a 

 "great many other metaphysical distinctions; that is the assumption 

 "that because you can g-ive two things different names, they must 

 "therefore have different natures. It is difficult to understand how 

 "anybody who has ever kept a dog, or seen an elephant, can have any 

 "doubts as to an animal's power of performing the essential processes 

 "of reasoning." 



