96 THE DESCENT OF MAN. 



shall hereafter see, from any unsatisfied instinct, would arise, 

 as often as it was perceived that the enduring and always present 

 social instinct had yielded to some other instinct, at the time 

 stronger, but neither enduring in its nature, nor leaving behind 

 it a very vivid impression. It is clear that many instinctive de- 

 sires, such as that of hunger, are in their nature of short dura- 

 tion; and after being satisfied, are not readily or vividly recalled. 

 Thirdly, after the power of language had been acquired, and the 

 wishes of the community could be expressed, the common opinion 

 how each member ought to act for the public good, would natural- 

 ly become in a paramount degree the guide to action. But it 

 should be borne in mind that however great weight we may attrib- 

 ute to public opinion, our regard for the approbation and dis- 

 approbation of our fellows depends on sympathy, which, as we 

 shall see, forms an essential part of the social instinct, and is 

 indeed its foundation-stone. Lastly, habit in the individual would 

 ultimately play a very important part in guiding the conduct of 

 each member; for the social instinct, together with sympathy, 

 is, like any other instinct, greatly strengthened by habit, and so 

 consequently would be obedience to the wishes and judgment of 

 the community. These several subordinate propositions must now 

 be discussed, and some of them at considerable length. 



It may be well first to premise that I do not wish to maintain 

 that any strictly social animal, if its intellectual faculties were 

 to become as active and as highly developed as in man, would 

 acquire exactly the same moral sense as ours. In the same man- 

 ner as various animals have some sense of beauty, though they 

 admire widely different objects, so they might have a sense of 

 right and wrong, though led by it to follow widely different lines 

 of conduct. If, for instance, to take an extreme case, men were 

 reared under precisely the same conditions as hive-bees, there 

 can hardly be a doubt that our unmarried females would, like 

 the worker-bees, think it a sacred duty to kill their brothers, and 

 mothers would strive to kill their fertile daughters; and no one 

 would think of interfering." Nevertheless, the bee, or any other 



" Mr. H. Sidgwick remarks in an able discussion on tliis subject (the 

 'Academy,' June 15th, 1872, p. 231), "a superior bee, we may feel sure, 

 "would aspire to a, milder solution of the population question." Judg- 

 ing, however, from the habits of many or most savages, man solves the 

 problem by female infanticide, polyandry and promiscuous Inter- 

 course; therefore it may well be doubted whether it would be by a 

 milder method. Miss Cobbe, in commenting ('Darwinism in Morals,' 

 'Theological Review," April, 1872, p. 188-191) on the same illustration, 

 says, the principles of social duty would be thus reversed; and by this, 

 I presume, she means that the fulfillment of a social duty would tend 

 to the injury of individuals; but she overlooks the fact, which she 

 would doubtless admit, that the instincts of the bee have been ac- 



