106 THE DESCENT OF MAN. 



it is almost certain that he would inherit a tendency to tie faith- 

 ful to his comrades, and obedient to the leader of his tribe for 

 these qualities are common to most social animals. He would 

 consequently possess some capacity for self-command. He 

 would from an inherited tendency be willing to defend, in con- 

 cert with others, his fellow-men; and would be ready to aid 

 them in any way, which did not too greatly interfere with his 

 own welfare or his own strong desires. 



The social animals which stand at the bottom of the scale are 

 guided almost exclusively, and those which stand higher in the 

 scale are largely guided, by special instincts in the aid which 

 they give to the members of the same community; but they are 

 likewise in part Impelled by mutual love and sympathy, assisted 

 apparently by some amount of reason. Although man, as just 

 remarked, has no special instincts to tell him how to aid his 

 fellow-men, he still has the Impulse, and with his improved 

 intellectual faculties would naturally be much guided in this re- 

 spect by reason and experience. Instinctive sympathy would 

 also cause him to value highly the approbation of his fellows; 

 for, as Mr. Bain has clearly shown,^* the love of praise and the 

 strong feeling of glory, and the still stronger horror of scorn 

 and infamy, "are due to the workings of sympathy." Conse- 

 quently man would be influenced in the highest degree by the 

 wishes, approbation, and blame of his fellow-men, as expressed 

 by their gestures and language. Thus the social instincts, 

 which must have been acquired by man in a very rude state, 

 and probably even by his early ape-like progenitors, still give 

 the impulse to some of his best actions; but his actions are in a 

 higher degree determined by the expressed wishes and judgment 

 of his fellow-men, and unfortunately very often by his own 

 strong selfish desires. But as love, sympathy and self-command 

 become strengthened by habit, and as the power of reasoning 

 becomes clearer, so that man can value justly the judgments of 

 his fellows, he will feel himself impelled, apart Irom any transi- 

 tory pleasure or pain, to certain lines of conduct. He might 

 then declare — not that any barbarian or uncultivated man could 

 thus think — I am the supreme judge of my own conduct, and in 

 the words of Kant, I will not in my own person violate the 

 dignity of humanity. 



The more enduring Social InsUncts conquer the less persistent 

 Instincts. — We have not, however, as yet considered the main 

 point, on which, from our present point of view, the whole 

 question of the moral sense turns. Why should a man feel that 

 he ought to obey one instinctive desire rather than another? 



=* 'Mental and Moral Science,' 186S, p. 254. 



