MORAL SENSE. 107 



Why is he bitterly regretful, if he has yielded to a strong sense 

 of self-preservation, and has not risked his life to save that of a 

 fellow-creature? or why does he regret having stolen food from 

 hunger? 



It is evident in the first place, that with mankind the instinc- 

 tive impulses have different degrees of strength; a savage will 

 risk his own life to save that of a member of the same com- 

 munity, but will be wholly indifferent about a stranger: a young 

 and timid mother urged by the maternal instinct will, without 

 a moment's hesitation, run the greatest danger for her own in- 

 fant, but not for a mere fellow-creature. Nevertheless many a 

 civilized man, or even boy, who never before risked his life for 

 another, but full of courage and sympathy, has disregarded 

 the instinct of self-preservation, and plunged at once into a 

 torrent to save a drowning man, though a stranger. In this case 

 man is impelled by the same instinctive motive, which made the 

 heroic little American monkey, formerly described, save his 

 keeper, by attacking the great and dreaded baboon. Such ac- 

 tions as the above appear to be the simple result of the greater 

 strength of the social or maternal instincts than that of any 

 other instinct or motive; for they are performed too instan- 

 taneously for reflection, or for pleasure or pain to be felt at the 

 time; though, if prevented by any cause, distress or even misery 

 might be felt. In a timid man, on the other hand, the instinct 

 of self-preservation might be so strong, that he would be unable 

 to force himself to run any such risk, perhaps not even for his 

 own child. 



I am aware that some persons maintain that actions performed 

 impulsively, as in the above cases, do not come under the do- 

 minion of the moral fsense, and cannot be called moral. They 

 confine this term to actions done deliberately, after a victory 

 over opposing desires, or when prompted by some exalted mo- 

 tive. But it appears scarcely possible to draw any clear line 

 of distinction of this kind.'" As far as exalted motives are 

 concerned, many instances have been recorded of savages, des- 

 titute of any feeling of general benevolence towards mankind, 

 and not guided by any religious motive, who have deliberately 

 sacrificed their lives as prisoners,-" rather than betray their 



2= I refer here to the distinction between what has been called ma- 

 terial and formal morality. I am glad to And that Prof. Huxley 

 ('Critiques and Addresses,' 1873, p. 287) takes the same view on this 

 subject as I do. Mr. Leslie Stephen remarks ('Essays on Preethinking 

 and Plain Speaking,' 1873, p. 83), "the metaphysical distinction be- 

 "tween material and formal morality is as irrelevant as other such dis- 

 "tinctions." 



'^ I have given one such case, namely of three Patagonian Indians 



