108 THE DESCENT OF MAN. 



comrades; and surely their conduct ought to be considered as 

 moral. As far as deliberation, and the victory over opposing 

 motives are concerned, animals may be seen doubting between 

 opposed Instincts, in rescuing their offspring or comrades from 

 danger; yet their actions, though done for the good of others, 

 are not called moral. Moreover, anything performed very often 

 by us, will at last be done without deliberation or hesitation, 

 and can then hardly be distinguished from an instinct; yet 

 surely no one will pretend that such an action ceases to be 

 moral. On the contrary, we all feel that an act cannot be 

 considered as perfect, or as performed in the most noble manner, 

 unless it be done Impulsively, without deliberation or effort, in 

 the same manner as by a man in whom the requisite qualities are 

 innate. He who is forced to overcome his fear or want of sym- 

 pathy before he acts, deserves, however, in one way higher 

 credit than the man whose innate disposition leads him to a 

 good act without effort. As we cannot distinguish between 

 motives, we rank all actions of a certain class as moral, if per- 

 formed by a moral being. A moral being is one who is capable 

 of comparing his past and future actions or motives, and of 

 approving or disapproving of them. We have no reason to sup- 

 pose that any of the lower animals have this capacitj'; there- 

 fore, when a Newfoundland dog drags a child out of the water, 

 or a monkey faces danger to rescue its comrade, or takes charge 

 of an orphan monkey, we do not call its conduct moral. But 

 in the case of man, who alone can with certainty be ranked 

 as a moral being, actions of a certain class are called moral, 

 whether performed deliberately, after a struggle with opposing 

 motives, or impulsively through instinct, or from the effects of 

 slowly-gained habit. 



But to return to our more immediate subject. Although some 

 Instincts are more powerful than others, and thus lead to cor- 

 responding actions, yet it is untenable, that in man the social 

 Instincts (including the love of praise and fear of blame) possess 

 greater strength, or have, through long habit, acquired greater 

 strength than the Instincts of self-preservation, hunger, lust, 

 vengeance, &c. Why then does man regret, even though trying 

 to fanlsh such regret, that he has followed the one natural 

 impulse rather than the other; and why does he further feel 

 that he ought to regret his conduct? Man in this respect differs 

 profoundly from the lower animals. Nevertheless we can, I think, 

 see with some degree of clearness the reason of this difference. 



Man, from the activity of his mental faculties, cannot avoid 

 reflection: past impressions and images are incessantly and 



who preferred being shot, one after the other, to betraying- the plans 

 of their companions In war ('Journal of Researches,' 1845, p. 103). 



