112 THE DESCENT OF MAN. 



"violate this law is a crime whicli the Australians hold in the 

 "greatest abhorrence, in this agreeing exactly with certain 

 "tribes of North America. When the question is put in either 

 "district, is it worse to kill a ^irl of a foreign tribe, or to marry 

 "a girl of one's own, an answer just opposite to ours would be 

 "given without hesitation.""' We may, therefore, reject the be- 

 lief, lately insisted on by some writers, that the abhorrence of 

 incest is due to our possessing a special God-implanted con- 

 science. On the whole it is intelligible, that a man urged by 

 so powerful a sentiment as remorse, though arising as above 

 explained, should be led to act in a manner, which he has been 

 taught to believe serves as an expiation, such as delivering him- 

 self up to justice. 



Man prompted by his conscience, will through long habit ac- 

 quire such perfect self-command, that his desires and passions 

 will at last yield instantly and without a struggle to his social 

 sympathies and instincts, including his feeling for the judgment 

 of his fellows. The still hungry, or the still revengeful man will 

 not think of stealing food, or of wreaking his vengeance. It is 

 possible, or as we shall hereafter see, even probable, that the 

 habit of self-command may, like other habits, be inherited. Thus 

 at last man comes to feel, through acquired and perhaps inherited 

 habit, that it is best for him to obey his more persistent impulses. 

 The imperious word ought seems merely to imply the conscious- 

 ness of the existence of a rule of conduct, however it may have 

 originated. Formerly it must have been often vehemently urged 

 that an insulted gentleman ought to fight a duel. We even say 

 that a pointer ought to point, and a retriever to retrieve game. If 

 they fail to do so, they fail in their duty and act wrongly. 



If any desire or instinct leading to an action opposed to the 

 good of others still appears, when recalled to mind, as strong 

 as, or stronger than, the social instinct, a man will feel no keen 

 regret at having followed it; but he will be conscious that if his 

 conduct were known to his fellows, it would meet with their 

 disapprobation; and few are so destitute of sympathy as not to 

 feel discomfort when this is realized. If he has no such sym- 

 pathy, and if his desires leading to bad actions are at the time 

 strong, and when recalled are not over-mastered by the persistent 

 social instincts, and the judgment of others, then he is essentially 

 a bad man;»» and the sole restraining motive left is the fear of 

 punishment, and the conviction that in the long run it would be 

 best for his own selfish interests to regard the good of others 

 rather than his own. 



2» E. B. Tylor in 'Contemporary Review,' April, 1873, p. 707. 



=»Dr. Prosper Despine, in hiis 'Psychologrie Natureile,' 1868 (torn, i, p. 

 243; torn. ii. p. 169) gives many curious cases of the worst criminals, 

 who apparently have been entirely destitute of conscience. 



