MORAL SENSE. 115 



a coward, however benevolent. Prudence, on the other hand, 

 which does not concern the welfare of others, though a very use- 

 ful virtue, has never been highly esteemed. As no man can 

 practice the virtues necessary for the welfare of his tribe without 

 self-sacrifice, self-command, and the power of endurance, these 

 qualities have been at all times highly and most justly valued. 

 The American savage voluntarily submits to the most horrid 

 tortures without a groan, to prove and strengthen his fortitude 

 and courage; and we cannot help admiring him, or even an In- 

 dian Fakir, who, from a foolish religious motive, swings sus- 

 pended by a hook buried in his flesh. 



The other so called self-regarding virtues, which do not ob- 

 viously, though they may really, affect the welfare of the tribe, 

 have never been esteemed by savages, though now highly appre- 

 ciated by civilized nations. The greatest intemperance is no 

 reproach with savages. Utter licentiousness, and unnatural 

 crimes, prevail to an astounding extent."" As soon, however, as 

 marriage, whether polygamous, or monogamous, becomes com- 

 mon, jealousy will lead to the inculcation of female virtue; and 

 this, being honored, will tend to spread to the unmarried females. 

 How slowly it spreads to the male sex, we see at the present day. 

 Chastity eminently requires self-command; therefore it has been 

 honored from a very early period in the moral history of civilized 

 man. As a consequence of this, the senseless practice of celibacy 

 has been ranked from a remote period as a virtue." The hatred 

 of indecency, which appears to us so natural as to be thought in- 

 nate, and which is so valuable an aid to chastity, is a modern 

 virtue, appertaining exclusively, as Sir G. Staunton remarks,"' to 

 civilized life. This is shown by the ancient religious rites of 

 various nations, by the drawings on the walls of Pompeii, and 

 by the practices of many savages. 



We have now seen that actions are regarded by savages, and 

 were probably so regarded by primeval man, as good or bad, 

 solely as they obviously affect the welfare of the tribe, — not that 

 of the species, nor that of an individual member of the tribe. 

 This conclusion agrees well with the belief that the so-called 

 moral sense is aboriginally derived from the social instincts, for 

 both relate at first exclusively to the community. The chief 

 causes of the low morality of savages, as judged by our standard, 

 are, firstly, the confinement of sympathy to the same tribe. Sec- 

 ondly, powers of reasoning insuflicient to recognize the bearing 

 of many virtues, especially of the self-regarding virtues, on the 



" Mr. M'Lennan has ^ven ("Primitive Marriage,' 1865, p. 176) a good 

 coUeotion of facts on this head. 

 2^ Lecky, 'History of European Morals,' vol. i. 1869, p. 109. 

 i" 'Embassy to China,' vol. ii. p. 348. 



