116 THE DESCENT OP MAN. 



general welfare of the tribe. Savages, for instance, fail to trace 

 the multiplied evils consequent on a want of temperance, chas- 

 tity, &c. And, thirdly, weak power of self command; for this 

 power has not been strengthened through long-continued, per- 

 haps inherited, habit, instruction and religion. 



I have entered into the above details on the immorality of 

 savages,™ because some authors have recently taken a high view 

 of their moral nature, or have attributed most of their crimes to 

 mistaken benevolence." These authors appear to rest their con- 

 clusion on savages possessing those virtues which are serviceable, 

 or even necessary, for the existence of the family and of the 

 tribe,— qualities which they undoubtedly do possess, and often in 

 a high degree. 



Concluding Remarks. — It was assumed formerly by philoso- 

 phers of the derivative" school of morals that the foundation of 

 morality lay in a form of Selfishness; but more recently the 

 "Greatest happiness principle" has been brought prominently 

 forward. It is, however, more correct to speak of the latter prin- 

 ciple as the standard, and not as the motive of conduct. Never- 

 theless, all the authors whose works I have consulted, with a few 

 exceptions,*^ write as if there must be a distinct motive for every 

 action, and that this must be associated with some pleasure or 

 displeasure. But man seems often to act impulsively, that is 

 from instinct or long habit, without any consciousness of pleasure, 



^ See on this subject copious evidence in Chap. vii. of Sir J. Lub- 

 bocli, 'Origin of Civilization,' 1870. 



^0 For instance, Leclcy, 'Hist. European Morals,' vol. i. p. 124. 



*i This term is used in an able article in the 'Westminster Review,' 

 Oct. 1869, p. 498. For the "Greatest happiness principle," see J. S. Mill, 

 'Utilitarianism,' p. 17. 



'- Mill recognizes ('System of Logic,' vol. ii. p. 422) in the clearest 

 manner, that actions may be performed through habit without the 

 anticipation of pleasure. Mr. H. Sidgwiok also in his Essay on Pleas- 

 ure and Desire ('The Contemporary Review, 'April 1872, p. 671), remarks: 

 "To sum up, in contravention of the doctrine that our conscious ac- 

 "tive impulses are always directed towards the production of agreeable 

 "sensations in ourselves, I would maintain that we find everywhere in 

 "consciousness extra-regarding impulse, directed towards something 

 "that is not pleasure; that in many cases the impulse is so far incom- 

 "patible with the self-regarding that the two do not easily co-exist in 

 "the same moment of consciousness." A dim feeling that our impulses 

 do not by any means always arise from any contemporaneous or an- 

 ticipated pleasure, has, I cannot but think, beem one chief cause of the 

 acceptance of the intuitive theory of morality, and of the rejection of 

 the utilitarian or "Greatest happiness" theory. With respect to the 

 latter theory, the standard and the motive of conduct have no doubt 

 often been confused, but they are really in some degree blenrted. 



