MORAL SENSE. 117 



in the same manner as does probalaly a bee or ant, when it 

 blindly follows its instincts. Under circumstances of extreme 

 peril, as during a fire, when a man endeavors to save a fellow- 

 creature without a moment's hesitation, he can hardly feel pleas- 

 ure; and still less has he time to reflect on the dissatisfaction 

 which he might subsequently experience if he did not make the 

 attempt. Should he afterwards reflect over his own conduct, he 

 would feel that there lies within him an impulsive power widely 

 different from a search after pleasure or happiness; and this 

 seems to be the deeply planted social instinct. 



In the case of the lower animals it seems much more appro- 

 priate to speak of their social instincts, as having been developed 

 for the general good rather than for the general happiness of the 

 species. The term, general good, may be defined as the rearing 

 of the greatest number of individuals in full vigor and health, 

 with all their faculties perfect, under the conditions to which 

 they are subjected. As the social instincts both of man and the 

 lower animals have no doubt been developed by nearly the same 

 steps, it would be advisable, if found practicable, to use the same 

 definition in both cases, and to take as the standard of morality, 

 the general good or welfare of the community, rather than the 

 general happiness; but this definition would perhaps require some 

 limitation on account of political ethics. 



When a man risks his life to save that of a fellow-creature, it 

 seems also more correct to say that he acts for the general good, 

 rather than for the general happiness of mankind. No doubt 

 the welfare and the happiness of the individual usually coincide; 

 and a contented, happy tribe will flourish better than one that 

 is discontented and unhappy. We have seen that even at an 

 early period in the history of man, the expressed wishes of the 

 community will have naturally influenced to a large extent the 

 conduct of each member; and as all wish for happiness, the 

 "greatest happiness principle" will have become a most important 

 secondary guide and object; the social instinct, however, together 

 with sympathy (which leads to our regarding the approbation 

 and disapprobation of others), having served as the primary im- 

 pulse and guide. Thus the reproach is removed of laying the 

 foundation of the noblest part of our nature in the base principle 

 of selfishness; unless, indeed, the satisfaction which every animal 

 feels, when it follows its proper instincts, and the dissatisfaction 

 felt when prevented, be called selfish. 



The wishes and opinions of the members of the same com- 

 munity, expressed at first orally, but later by writing also, either 

 form the sole guides of our conduct, or greatly reinforce the 

 social instincts; such opinions, however, have sometimes a ten- 

 dency directly opposed to these instincts. This latter fact is 

 well exemplified by the Law of Honor, that is, the law of the 



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