118 THE DESCENT OP MAN. 



opinion of our equals, and not of all our countrymen. The breach 

 of this law, even when the breach is known to' be strictly ac- 

 cordant with true morality, has caused many a man more agony 

 than a real crime. We recognize the same influence in the burn- 

 ing sense of shame which most of us have felt, even after the 

 interval of years, when calling to mind some accidental breach 

 of a trifling, though fixed, rule of etiquette. The judgment of 

 the community will generally be guided by some rude experience 

 of what is best in the long run for all the members; but this 

 judgment will not rarely err from ignorance and weak powers of 

 reasoning. Hence the strangest customs and superstitions, in 

 complete opposition to the true welfare and happiness of man- 

 kind, have become all-powerful throughout the world. We see 

 this in the horror felt by a Hindoo who breaks his caste, and 

 in many other such cases. It would be difficult to distinguish 

 between the remorse felt by a Hindoo who has yielded to the 

 temptation of eating unclean food, from that felt after commit- 

 ting a theft; but the former would probably be the more severe. 



How so many absurd rules of conduct, as well as so many absurd 

 religious beliefs, have originated, we do not know; nor how 

 it is that they have become, in all quarters of the world, so 

 deeply impressed on the mind of men; but it is worthy of re- 

 mark that a belief constantly inculcated during the early years of 

 life, whilst the brain is impressible, appears to acquire almost 

 the nature of an instinct; and the very essence of an instinct is 

 that it is followed independently of reason. Neither can we say 

 why certain admirable virtues, such as the love of truth, are 

 much more highly appreciated by some savage tribes than by 

 others;" nor, again, why similar differences prevail even amongst 

 highly civilized nations. Knowing how firmly fixed many strange 

 customs and superstitions have become, we need feel no surprise 

 that the self-regarding virtues, supported as they are by reason, 

 should now appear to us so natural as to be thought innate, al- 

 though they were not valued by man in his early condition. 



Notwithstanding many sources of doubt, man can generally 

 and readily distinguish between the higher and lower moral 

 rules. The higher are founded on the social instincts, and relate 

 to the welfare of others. They are supported by the approbation 

 of our fellow-men and by reason. The lower rules, though some 

 of them when implying self-sacrifice hardly deserve to be called 

 lower, relate chiefly to self, and arise from public opinion, ma- 

 tured by experience and cultivation; for they are not practiced 

 by rude tribes. 



" Good instances are given by Mr. Wallace in 'Scientific Opinion,' 

 Sept. 15, 1869; aJid more fully in his 'Contributions to the Theory of 

 Natural Selection,' 18T0, p. 353. 



