GENERAL, SUMMARY. 605 



which would never arise from the mere impression of the senses, 

 or if they did arise, could not he followed out. The higher in- 

 tellectual powers of man, such as those of ratiocination, abstrac- 

 tion, self-consciousness, &c., probably follow from the continued 

 improvement and exercise of the other mental faculties. 



The development of the moral qualities is a more interesting 

 problem. The foundation lies in the social instincts, including 

 under this term the family ties. These instincts are highly com- 

 plex, and in the case of the lower animals give special tendencies 

 toward certain definite actions; but the more important ele- 

 ments are love, and the distinct emotion of sympathy. Animals 

 endowed with the social instincts take pleasure in one another's 

 company, warn one another of danger, defend and aid one an- 

 other in many ways. These instincts do not extend to all the 

 individuals of the species, but only to those of the same commu- 

 nity. As they are highly beneficial to the species, they have in 

 all probability been acquired through natural selection. 



A moral being is one who is capable of reflecting on his past 

 actions and their motives — of approving of some and disapprov- 

 ing of others; and the fact that man is the one being who cer- 

 tainly deserves this designation, is the greatest of all distinctions 

 between him and the lower animals. But in the fourth chapter 

 I have endeavored to show that the moral sense follows, firstly, 

 from the enduring and ever-present nature of the social instincts; 

 secondly, from man's appreciation of the approbation and dis- 

 approbation of his fellows; and thirdly, from the high activity 

 of his mental faculties, with past impressions extremely vivid; 

 and in these latter respects he differs from the lower animals. 

 Owing to this condition of mind, man cannot avoid looking both 

 backwards and forwards, and comparing past impressions. Hence 

 after some temporary desire or passion has mastered. his social 

 instincts, he reflects and compares the now weakened impression 

 of such past impulses with the ever-present social instincts; and 

 he then feels that sense of dissatisfaction which all unsatisfled in- 

 stincts leave behind them, he therefore resolves to act differently 

 for the future, — and this is conscience. Any instinct, permanent- 

 ly stronger or more enduring than another, gives rise to a feeling 

 which we express by saying that it ought to be obeyed. A pointer 

 dog, if able to reflect on his past conduct, would say to himself, 

 I ought (as indeed we say of him) to have pointed at that hare 

 and not have yielded to the passing temptation of hunting it. 



Social animals are impelled partly by a wish to aid the members 

 of their community in a general manner, but more commonly to 

 perform certain definite actions. Man is impelled by the same 

 general wish to. aid his fellows; but has few or no special in- 

 stincts. He differs also from the lower animals in the power of 

 expressing his desires by words, which thus become a guide to 



