606 THE DESCENT OF MAN. 



the aid required and bestowed. The motive to give aid is likewise 

 much modified in man: it no longer consists solely of a blind 

 Instinctive impulse, but is much influenced by the praise or blame 

 of his fellows. The appreciation and the bestowal of praise and 

 blame both rest on sympathy; and this emotion, as we have 

 seen, is one of the most important elements of the social in- 

 stincts. Sympathy, though gained as an instinct, is also much 

 strengthened by exercise or habit. As all men desire their own 

 happiness, praise or blame is bestowed on actions and motives, 

 according as they lead to this end; and as happiness is an essen- 

 tial part of the general good, the greatest-happiness principle in- 

 directly serves as a nearly safe standard of right and wrong. 

 As the reasoning powers advance and experience is gained, the 

 remoter effects of certain lines of conduct on the character of 

 the individual, and on the general good, are perceived; and then 

 the self-regarding virtues come within the scope of public opin- 

 ion, and receive praise, and their opposites blame. But with the 

 less civilized nations reason often errs, and many bad customs 

 and base superstitions come within the same scope, and are then 

 esteemed as high virtues, and their breach as heavy crimes. 



The moral faculties are generally and justly esteemed as of 

 higher value than the intellectual powers. But we should bear 

 in mind that the activity of the mind in vividly recalling past 

 impressions is one of the fundamental though secondary bases 

 of conscience. This affords the strongest argument for educating 

 and stimulating in all possible ways the intellectual faculties of 

 every human being. No doubt a man with a torpid mind, if his 

 social affections and sympathies are well developed, will be led 

 to good actions, and may have a fairly sensitive conscience. But 

 whatever renders the imagination more vivid and strengthens the 

 habit of recalling and comparing past impressions, will make 

 the conscience more sensitive, and may even somewhat com- 

 pensate for weak social affections and sympathies. 



The moral nature of man has reached its present standard, 

 partly through the advancement of his reasoning powers and 

 consequently of a just public opinion, but especially fropi his 

 sympathies having been rendered more tender and widely dif- 

 fused through the effects of habit, example, instruction, and re- 

 flection. It is not improbable that after lopg practice virtuous 

 tendencies may be inherited. With the more civilized races, the 

 conviction of the existence of an all-seeing Deity has had a potent 

 influence on the advance of morality. Ultimately man dges not 

 accept the praise or blame of his fellows as his sole guide, though 

 few escape this influence, but his habitual convictions, controlled 

 by reason, afford him the safest rule. His conscience then be- 

 comes the supreme judge and monitor. Nevertheless the first 

 foundation or origin of the moral sense lies in the social instincts. 



