40 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON. 
belligerence of the Confederates, and to the conse- 
quent facility of the latter to obtain supplies; and 
also, though less so, yet in an appreciable degree, to 
the naval warfare which the Confederates carried on 
against us from the basis of operations of the ports 
of Great Britain. 
Careful perusal of the instructions to Mr. Motley 
would have shown that the President of the United 
States, while persisting to claim reparation for all in- 
juries done by Confederate cruisers, whether to indi- 
viduals or to the nation, did not insist on the recog- 
nition of belligerence as a continuing subject of claim 
of Great Britain. 
Conscious of this distinction, while the American 
Commissioners would not relinquish claim on account 
of any thing done by Confederate cruisers, the British 
Commissioners were content with stipulations of in- 
demnity, which covered all national claims of the last 
category, but did not reach back to claims on account 
of the unreasonableness and prematurity of the proc- 
lamation of the Queen. 
That is what is meant by Mr. Bernard in his lect- 
ure at Oxford, where he speaks of the specific char- 
acter of the stipulations: they were specific, confined 
to acts of the Confederate cruisers. And the point 
is clearly evolved in the debate in the House of Lords 
on occasion of the presentation of the Treaty, when 
Lord Russell objected that it was no better for Great 
Britain than the Johnson-Clarendon Treaty, and Lord 
Granville replied that it was better, because, while it 
includes claims on account of acts of cruisers, it does 
