‘90 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON. 
Hardy, as well as Mr. Mill, who spoke on the other 
side of the general question, said that the charge was 
“not law,” and was “without legal authority.” Mr. 
Finlason, a most competent authority, said that, “al- 
though the charge dealt so largely in denunciation,” 
it was “utterly indeterminate and indecisive ;” that 
“it avowed a state of entire doubt;” that, though 
“there was much denunciation of law laid down [by 
others], there was no positive declaration of law laid 
down by the Chief Justice.” The same writer also 
points out grave mistakes of history as well as errors 
of law in this charge, Thus, the Chief Justice as. 
sumes, as a cardinal thought, that martial Jaw and 
military law are one and the same thing: a mistake, 
which implies extraordinary confusion of mind, for- 
getfulness of his own official opinions in the inci- 
dents of the rebellion in Ceylon, and ignorance of 
the most commonplace events of English history, for 
instance, as detailed in Hallam and Macaulay. 
I allude to these criticisms for the reason that, as 
will appear in the sequel, the same singular intellect- 
ual traits and moral characteristics of the Chief Jus: 
tice, which became conspicuous at Geneva, had shown 
themselves on the Queen’s Bench, and had attracted 
the notice of his fellow-countrymen. 
I refer to this charge for another cause. It is diffi- 
cult for many reasons to measure the exact personal 
value of ordinary legal opinions delivered, in the 
course of adjudication, by any judge of the Queen's 
Bench. All such difficulties cease when he goes out 
of his way to deliver a demonstrative charge to a 
