136 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON. 
Examination of the substance of the “ Reasons” 
leads to still more unfavorable conclusions. 
While the Chief Justice exhausts himself in fault- 
finding with the Counsel of the United States, it is 
observable that he seldom, if ever, grapples with their 
arguments, but shoots off instead into epithets of mere 
vituperation. Indeed, if it were worth while, it would 
be easy to show that he did not really read that which 
he so intemperately criticises. And when he under- 
takes to deal with the text, it is only in the disingen- 
‘uous manner of picking out here and there a detached 
paragraph or phrase for comment, regardless of the 
context or the general line of argument. 
Nevertheless, when he has occasion to differ in 
opinion with the Counsel of the United States, such 
is the perverted state of passion and prejudice in 
which he thinks and writes, that he imputes to us in- 
tention to practice on the “supposed credulity and 
ignorance” of the Tribunal. 
We were not amenable in anywise to the British 
Arbitrator; but, if we had been barristers in his own 
Court of whom such things were said by him, it would 
have been an example of judicial indecency to parallel 
which it would be necessary to go back to the days 
of infamous judges like Jeffreys or Scroggs. 
Let Sir Alexander be judged by his own rule. 
Cramming, as he did at Geneva, in the preparation of 
his “ Reasons,” he examined superficially and wrote 
precipitately: in consequence of which he copied 
from the Arguments for the British Government pal- 
pable errors, which were exposed and corrected in 
