144 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON. 
out pausing to consider whether these observations 
are perfectly accurate or not as a definition of the law 
of nations, we may assume that they are substantially 
so, and suffice at any rate to show clearly the uncan- 
did spirit of Sir Alexander’s criticism of the imputed 
language of Mr. Steempfli,—a criticism which calls to 
-mind a similar unjust and vicious reproach cast by 
Junius on Lord Mansfield. 
The actual statement of Mr. Steempfli, as we have 
seen, was unexceptionably accurate and precise, in so 
far as regarded the matters before the Tribunal. 
Meanwhile, Mr. Steempfli may have said orally, what 
he says here in print, that in many supposable cases 
of deficient explicitness either of the conventional 
rules or of the historic law of nations, “c’est au Tri- 
bunal d’y suppléer en interprétant et appliquant les 
trois régles de son mieux et en toute conscience.” 
That is what the Viscount of Itajubdé says in one 
of his opinions, namely, that a certain doctrine, assert- 
ed by the British Government, “ froisse la conscience.” 
It is what Count Sclopis intends, when he says, “ Les 
nations ont entre elles un droit commun, ou, si on aime 
mieux, un lien commun, formé par Véguité et sanc- 
tionné par le respect des intéréts réciproques;” and 
that such is the spirit of the Treaty of Washington, 
“qui ne fait que donner la préférence aux régles de 
léquité générale sur les dispositions d’une législation 
particuliére quelle qu’elle pute étre.” That is “the 
universal immutable justice,” which in all systems of 
law, international or national, distinguishes right from 
wrong, and to which the United States appealed in 
