HUXLEY, AND THE PROBLEM OF THE NATURALIST 43 



tion of man. The patch was cut off from the rest by a wall. . . . 

 In short, it was made into a garden. ... It will be admitted that 

 the garden is as much a work of art or artifice as anything that 

 can be mentioned. The energy localized in certain human bodies, 

 directed by similarly localized intellects, has produced a collocation 

 of other material bodies which could not be brought about in a 

 state of nature. The same proposition is true of all the works of 

 man's hands, from a flint implement to a cathedral or a chronom- 

 eter : and it is because it is true that we call these things arti- 

 ficial, term them works of art or artifice, by way of distinguishing 

 them from the products of the cosmic process, working outside 

 man, which we call nature, or works of nature. The distinction 

 thus drawn between the works of nature and those of man is 

 universally recognized, and it is, as I conceive, both useful and 

 justifiable." 



I trust that the thoughtful reader will perceive that the legiti- 

 mate pursuit of this line of reflection leads straight back to the 

 Aristotelian statement, in the essay of 1854 (III. ii. 40), that "to 

 the student of life [as contrasted with the student of physics] the 

 aspect of nature is reversed. Here incessant and, so far as we 

 know, spontaneous change is the rule ; rest the exception — the 

 anomaly to be accounted for. Living things have no inertia and 

 tend to no equilibrium." 



Many biologists find their greatest triumph in the doctrine that 

 the living body is a "mere machine"; but a machine is a colloca- 

 tion of matter and energy working for an end, not a spinning toy ; 

 and when the living machine is compared to the products of human 

 art, the legitimate deduction is that it is not merely a spinning 

 eddy in a stream of dead matter and mechanical energy, but a 

 little garden in the physical wilderness ; that the energy localized 

 in living bodies, directed by similarly localized vitality, has pro- 

 duced a collocation of other material bodies which could not be 

 brought about in a state of physical nature, and that the distinc- 

 tion thus drawn between the works of non-vital nature and those 

 of life is both useful and justifiable. 



What this distinction may mean in ultimate analysis I know 

 no more than Aristotle or Huxley ; nor do I believe that any one 

 ever will know until we find out. One thing we may be sure it 



