44 THE FOUNDATIONS OF ZOOLOGY 



does not mean — that the living world is anything but natural; for 

 all men of science must agree with Aristotle (" Parts of Animals," 

 III. ii. i6) that "in all our speculations, therefore, concerning 

 nature, what we have to consider is the general rule " (not forces, 

 or causes, or necessary laws). " For that is natural which holds 

 good either universally or generally." If we are to understand 

 this fitness which is so distinctive of living things, this must be 

 brought about, not by keeping it locked out of sight as a chamber 

 of horrors, but by bringing it into the bright light of day ; by 

 "intending the mind" upon it; by attacking it with Descartes' 

 method of using one's reason rightly for the discovery of truth. 

 Whether this method is or is not adequate, we shall know when 

 we find out ; but we have no other, and the discoveries of Wallace 

 and Darwin give a basis, not for a belief, but for a hope that it 

 may some day prove adequate. 



Times are changed since Huxley warned his hearer in 1868 

 that, in accepting protoplasm as the physical basis of life, he was 

 "placing his foot on the first rung of a ladder which, in most 

 people's estimation, is the reverse of Jacob's and leads to the an- 

 tipodes of heaven." Nowadays "Scientific Rip Van Winkle" and 

 " Aristotelian " are the mildest phrases applied to him who holds 

 that life is more than a basis, — to him who doubts whether the 

 essay states the whole or even the most essential part of the 

 case ; and he is lucky if he is not told that he is a " Spiritualist," 

 "false to the spirit of Science"; or at the very least that he is 

 "illogical." In this case he can only say with Huxley (IX. 10, 

 1894) that "if it is urged that the . . . cosmic process cannot be 

 in antagonism with that . . . which is part of itself, I can only 

 reply that if the conclusion that the two are antagonistic is logi- 

 cally absurd, I am sorry for the logic, because, as we have seen, 

 the fact is so " ; or, as Aristotle expresses it, it holds good. 



My own interest in this distinction is entirely practical and not 

 philosophical. Whatever philosophical basis it may have or may 

 not have, it seems to me that no one can question its practical 

 bearing on the study of biology at the present day and for many 

 ages to come. If it is urged that our knowledge of the external 

 world is destined to be resolved, in the long run, into our con- 

 sciousness of changes in the physical basis of our minds, and 



