LOUIS AGASSIZ AND GEORGE BERKELEY 327 



and that no one who is convinced that natural knowledge is useful 

 need ask whether nature is intended, with any doubt of the answer. 



He holds, indeed, that we cannot be sure that nature is a lan- 

 guage unless we are convinced that it is nothing but a language ; 

 for while his idealistic philosophy is only a means to an end, he 

 holds it essential for the attainment of this end; although the 

 modern zoologist must ask whether he is right, or whether, on the 

 contrary, one who does not know what the relation between mind 

 and matter is may not- agree with him that nature is a language. 



Berkeley's teleological argument is set forth in all his writings ; 

 but it is, perhaps, less complicated by metaphysics in the fourth 

 dialogue with Alciphron than anywhere else. 



Alciphron asserts that no evidence which is not as conclusive 

 as that which proves the existence of his fellow-men will convince 

 him of the existence of a God. 



He says: "Nothing so much convinces me of the existence of 

 another person as his speaking to me. It is my hearing you talk 

 that, in strict and philosophical truth, is to me the best argument 

 for your being. And this is a peculiar argument, inapplicable to 

 your purpose ; for you will not, I suppose, pretend that God speaks 

 to man in the same clear and sensible manner as one man doth 

 to another? 



" What I mean, is not the sound of speech merely as such, but 

 the arbitrary use of sensible signs, which have no similitude or 

 necessary connection with the things signified ; so as by the appo- 

 site management of them to suggest and exhibit to my mind an 

 endless variety of things differing in nature, time, and place ; thereby 

 informing me, entertaining me, and directing me how to act, not 

 only with regard to things near and present, but also with regard 

 to things distant and future. No matter whether these sounds are 

 pronounced or written ; whether they enter by the eye or ear ; they 

 have the same use, and are equally proofs of an intelligent, thinking, 

 designing cause." 



" But if it should appear that God really speaks to men, would 

 this content you } " asks Euphranor. 



" I am for admitting no inward speech, no holy instincts or sug- 

 gestions of light and spirit," answers Alciphron. "All that, you 

 must know, passeth with men of sense for nothing. If you do not 



