DUALISM 



form of nervous energy, and Ostwald has lately devel- 

 oped the theory in his Natural Philosophy. 



The processes of movement which we observe in every 

 change of one form of energy into another, or every 

 passage of potential into actual energy, are subordinate 

 to the general laws of mechanics. The dualist meta- 

 physic has rightly said that the mechanical philosophy 

 does not discover the inner causes of these movements. 

 It would seek these in psychic forces. On our monistic 

 principles they are not immaterial forces, but based on 

 the general sensation of substance, which we call psy- 

 choma, and add to energy and matter as a third attri- 

 bute of substance. 



' The dilHculty of combining our monism with Spinoza's 

 doctrine of substance is met by detaching the idea of 

 energy from sensation and restricting it to mechanics, so 

 as to make movement a third fundamental property of 

 substance with matter (the "extended") and sensation 



(the "thinking"). We may also divide energy into 

 active (=will in the sense of Schopenhauer) and pas- 

 sive (= sensation in the broadest sense). As a matter 

 of fact, the energy to which modem energism would re- 

 duce all phenomena has not an independent place in 

 Spinoza's system besides sensation; the attribute of 

 thought (the psyche, soul, force) comprises the two. I 

 am convinced that sensation is, like movement, found in 

 all matter, and this trinity of substance provides the 

 safest basis for modem monism. I may formulate it in 

 three propositions: (i) No matter without force and 

 without sensation. (2) No force without matter and 

 without sensation. (3) No sensation without matter 

 and without force. These three fundamental attributes 

 are found inseparably united throughout the whole 

 universe, in every atom and every molecule. In view 

 of the great importance of this view for our hylonistic 

 system of monism, it may be well to consider each of 



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