76 SALMON-FISHBBY OP SCOTLAIJD. 



Scotch law says, does not constitute a title, and the taking of 

 the fish alone does not constitute a title ; separately, they are 

 innocuous — quite harmless — useless ; but, united, they form a 

 good title, just as two ciphers, when added together, make an 

 unit, or two blanks a prize. Such is .the law brought into 

 existence by the opinions of judges, and by which the most 

 valuable property of individuals is disposed of. 



If we were to ask what has made this law, we believe any 

 judge would be somewhat puzzled to inform us. If he were 

 to tell us candidly the truth, he would say, " that which makes 

 nine-tenths of our law the mere accidental opinion of the 

 judge." When the legislature makes a law, there is debate 

 upon debate, it is canvassed in aU its parts, viewed in every light, 

 must pass through both Houses, and acquire the final sanction 

 of the King : but a judge saves himself all this trouble ; 

 in five minutes he makes a law at once ; declares any vague 

 idea which comes across his brain to be law ; and the one law 

 is just as effectual for the disposal of property as the other. 

 It is a pity, possessed of such despotic power, that where there 

 is not clear law, the judge does not always extract law from the 

 feeling or sentiment of justice. But the vulgar instinct of 

 justice is common to all men, and excites no admiration, while 

 a legal subtlety shows the acuteness of the mind of the judge. 

 Besides, if law were always founded in justice and common 

 sense (we mean the law dealt out to us, for sound law is ever 

 so), it would lose that mysteriousness, that charlatanism in 

 which it is enveloped, and which creates the wonderment of 

 the people. It is therefore necessary to show up the magic- 

 lantern, to keep the country in a state of delusion, and to add 

 to the dignity of the judge. In this respect the interest of the 

 legal profession and of the people is in direct opposition to each 

 other. It is the interest of the people that law should be ren- 

 dered as simple, and justice as certain as possible ; it is surely 

 not the interest of judges to perplex the law, in order to retain 

 their darling powee over property, though it may be of the 

 lawyers in order to increase litigation — which, if justice were 

 invariably to take place, would be reduced to one-half its 

 present extent. Accordingly, justice, as we said before, is in 



