582 LEGAL DEPARTMENT. 



tomed to do so before. As where oxen break the plaintiff's close and 

 kill his cow, the owner of the oxen will be liable to damages, without 

 proof that he knew they were accustomed to gore. 



Adjoining owners and occupants of lands are each required to main- 

 tain their portion of the division fence, and where injuries are occa- 

 sioned by domestic animals escaping through defects in that portion of 

 the fence that the complaining party was under obligation to maintain, 

 he cannot recover for such injury. Indeed, he may be liable for 

 injuries which may have resulted to the animals thus escaping, if shown 

 to be the proximate result of his negligence. 



Where there is no division fence, each owner or occupant must keep 

 his animals upon his own side of the line. Where there is a division 

 fence and it is divided, each adjoining owner must see to it that his 

 part of the fence is suitably maintained. Where there is no division of 

 the line fence, and either party refuses to make a division, then the 

 law in the various States provides a summary method for a compulsory 

 division of the fence, and when thus divided, the parties may be com- 

 pelled to build and maintain it. 



THE KEEPING OF DOGS. 



Perhaps there is no species of domestic animals in relation to which 

 controversies more frequently arise than in relation to dogs. The fol- 

 lowing propositions may be regarded as settled by the courts: 



An owner of lands may drive off trespassing animals with dogs, and 

 will not be liable unless they are vicious and unnecessarily bite and 

 lacerate the animals. (Smith v. Waldorf, 13 Hun, 127.) 



One keeping a vicious dog with knowledge of its propensities, is 

 responsible for injuries done by it. Negligence, in the ordinary sense, 

 is not an element of the cause of action. Nor is contributory negli- 

 gence a defense. To constitute a defense it must be established that 

 the injured person brought the injury on himself. (Lynch v. McNally, 

 73 N. Y. 347.) 



A person who keeps upon his premises ferocious dogs, and is aware 

 of their dangerous and vicious propensities, is liable for injuries to a 

 stranger, not an intentional trespasser, even though they had never 

 before bitten anyone. (Rider v. White, 65 N. Y. 54.) 



A servant may maintain an action against the master for injuries 

 received from his employer's dogs, though informed of the dog's vicious 

 disposition, where it had been the custom to tell the servant when the 



