LEGAL DEPARTMENT. 593 



made, if he had relied solely upon his own judgment in making the 

 purchase. But the warranty may be so worded as to protect the pur- 

 chaser against all consequences growing out of even an obvious defect. 

 Thus: A farmer may bargain for a horse known to him to be afflicted 

 in some way, but the seller agrees to deliver the horse at the end of ten 

 days, free from blemish. It was held in that case that the warranty 

 included the defect above mentioned. (Liddard v. Kain, 2 Bing. 183.) 

 A general warranty of soundness does not extend to visible defects. 

 This rule, however, does not extend to a visible defect, which could 

 not be discerned by the ordinary observer, and where skill is required 

 in its detection. (Birdseye v. Frost, 34 Barb. 367.) 



Nor does a general warranty cover defects of which the purchaser 

 had notice at the time of the agreement of purchase or acceptance of 

 the property. (Hinton v. Wilson, 22 Weekly Digest, 90.) 



A vendor of personal property is not liable for latent defects known 

 to him, but unknown to the purchaser, unless he has used some artifice 

 to deceive the purchaser in regard to such defects, or has warranted 

 the article. (McDonald v. Christie, 42 Barb. 36.) 



Where an article is warranted as fit for certain purposes, the seller is 

 liable for the injury sustained by the vendee in consequence of its 

 unfitness. (Milburn v. Belloni, 39 N. Y. 53.) 



But a warranty of the fitness of an article for a specific purpose will 

 not be implied from a knowledge on the part of the vender that it is 

 intended for such purpose. (Bartlett v. Hoppock, 34 N. Y. 118.) 



On the sale of an article known to be intended for food, there is an 

 implied warranty that it is sourwi, wholesome and fit to be used as an 

 article of food. (Burch v. Spencer, 15 Hun, 504.) 



In every sale of a personal chattel, there is an implied warranty of 

 title. (Carman v. Trude, 25 How. Pr. 440.) 



A sound price does not imply a warranty of soundness. (Hotchkiss 

 V. Gage, 26 Barb. 141.) 



And this implied warranty of title extends to prior liens and incum- 

 brances. (Dresser v. Ainsworth, 9 Barb. 619.) 



This implied warranty of title does not extend to a case where the 

 chattel is not in the possession of the vendor at the time of the sale. 

 (Scranton v. Clark, 39 N. Y. 220.) 



On the transfer of every negotiable security there is an implied war- 

 ranty that it is genuine, and not tainted with usury. (Herrick v. 

 Whitney, 15 Johns. 240; Meridan Nat. Bank v. Galludet, 120 N. Y. 298.) 



