626 



LEGAL DEPARTMENT. 



when the servant is otherwise notified. He does not take the risk of being 

 bitten when the dog is negligently left unfastened. (Mansfield v. Bad- 

 deley, 34 L. T. 696. ) 



The doctrine -of the non-liability of the master to the servant for inju- 

 ries of a co-servant cannot be invoked to shield the owner of a ferocious 

 animal from liabilities for injuries to the servant occasioned by negligence 

 of a fellow servant in not properly fastening the animal, or of not giving 

 notice of the animal being loose. 



The owner of a ferocious animal is not relieved from liability for in- 

 juries inflicted by it through slight negligence or want of ordinary care 

 on the part of the person injured. To constitute such a defense acts 

 must be proved, with notice of the character of the animal, establishing 

 that the person injured voluntarily brought the injury on himself. (Cur- 

 tis V. Mills, 5 C. & P. 489. ) 



No action lies for an injury arising from the defendant letting loose a 

 dog in his premises for their protection at night. (Brock v. Copeland, 

 I Esp. 203. ) 



The owner of a dog known by him to be ferocious, is liable, unless the 

 person injured voluntarily incurred the danger with a full knowledge of 

 its consequences. (Sarch v. Blackburn, M. and M. 505.) 



The owner of a vicious dog which is kept properly chained and under 

 restraint is not liable for injuries sustained by a person voluntarily com- 

 ing within its reach for the purpose of becoming familiar with it by 

 feeding. 



Merely showing that the dog was of a savage disposition and usually 

 tied up, and that the owner promised to make pecuniary satisfaction to 

 the plaintiff, is not sufficient proof of the owner's knowledge of the vicious 

 disposition of the dog to make him liable. (Beck v. Dyson, 4 Camp. 

 198.) 



If the owner of a dog appoints a servant to keep it, proof of the serv- 

 ant's knowledge of the dog's ferocity is sufficient proof of the knowl- 

 edge of the master to make him liable. (Baldwin v. Casella, L. R. 7 Ex. 



325-) 



A man can only keep a fierce watch dog for protection of his grounds 

 and house at his peril, and an innocent person coming there, bitten by 

 such a dog, may recover. (Stiles v. Cardiff, 33 L. J. 310.) 



It is not necessary to show an actual previous bite to enable a plaintiff 

 to recover. It is enough that the dog, to the owner's knowledge, has 



