GOVERNMENTAL SERVICES 153 
had dropped in pens of the stockyards company, 
the plaintiff is bound to show that the cattle 
alleged to have dropped the ticks were in the pens, 
and that they contaminated the same, and that 
the company did not disinfect the pens. It will 
be presumed that the stockyards company did its 
duty in the absence of evidence to the contrary. A 
purchaser who bought cattle subsequent to infec- 
tion, has no right of action for the negligence to 
which the disease is due, in the absence of evi- 
dence that the company knew, at the time of sale, 
that the cattle were infected.** 
A plaintiff rented a barn to defendant company, 
in which to house horses injured or temporarily 
incapacitated while performing certain work. The 
fact that defendant innocently housed a glandered 
horse in the barn, resulting in its destruction by 
the public authorities, did not constitute a tres- 
pass, and the defendant was not liable for the 
value of the barn.** (§ 211.) 
113, Law Versus Policy. Although, as we have 
stated, property which is taken and destroyed for 
the public good under police power differs from 
that taken under the power of eminent domain in 
that its confiscation imposes no legal obligation 
for payment, this is an extreme use of the power. 
‘‘Where it is proposed to exercise such an author- 
ity the constitutional right of private property 
must be weighed against the demands of the pub- 
lic welfare, and it is obvious that a public interest 
6s Eshleman v. Union Stock- & Co., 72 Wash. 482, 130 Pace. 
yards Co. 222 Pa. 20, 70 Atl 753, 44 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 1092. 
899. Affirmed on rehearing, 72 Wash. 
64 Farrar v. Andrew Peterson 482, 133 Pac. 594. 
