4 Darwin, and after Darwin. 
legitimate one for a naturalist to follow; and although 
Cuvier himself was far from being always loyal to it, 
he leaves no doubt regarding the estimate in which he 
held the still greater deviations of his colleagues, St. 
Hilaire and Lamarck. 
Now, these traditional notions touching the severance 
between the facts of natural history and the philosophy 
of it, continued more or less to dominate the minds of 
naturalists until the publication of the Origin of 
Species, in 1859. Then it was that an epoch was 
marked in this respect, as in so many other respects 
where natural history is concerned. For, looking to 
the enormous results which followed from a deliberate 
disregard of such traditional canons by Darwin, it has 
long since become impossible for naturalists, even of 
the strictest sect, not to perceive that their previous 
bondage to the law of a mere ritual has been for ever 
superseded by what verily deserves to be regarded as 
a new dispensation. Yet it cannot be said, or even so 
much as suspected, that Darwin’s method in any way 
resembled that of pre-scientific days, the revolt against 
which led to the straight-laced—and for a long time 
most salutary—conceptions of method that we have 
just been noticing. Where, then, is the difference? 
To me it seems that the difference is as follows; and, 
if so, that not the least of our many obligations to 
Darwin as the great organizer of biological science 
arises from his having clearly displayed the true 
principle which ought to govern biological research. 
To begin with, he nowhere loses sight of the 
primary distinction between fact and theory; so that, 
thus far, he loyally follows the spirit of revolt against 
subjective methods. But, while always holding this 
