Criticesms of Theory of Natural Selection. 339 
as we saw in the last chapter. Now all the promis- 
cuous variations which are supplied to the breeder, 
and out of which, by selecting only those that are 
suited to his purpose, he is able to produce the 
required result—all those promiscuous variations, in 
relation to that purpose, are accidental. Therefore 
the selective agency of the breeder deserves to be 
regarded as the cause of that which it produces, or 
of that which could not have been produced but for 
the operation of such agency. But where is th+ 
difference between artificial and natural selection in 
this respect? And, if there is no difference, is not 
natural selection as much entitled to be regarded as a 
true cause of the origin of natural species, as artificial 
selection is to be regarded as a true cause of our 
domesticated races? Here, as in the case of the 
previous illustration, if there be any ambiguity in 
speaking of variations as accidental, it arises from 
the incorrect or undefined manner in which the term 
“accidental” is used by Darwin’s critics. In its 
original and philosophically-correct usage, the term 
“accident” signifies a property or quality not essential 
to our conception of a substance: hence, it has come 
to mean anything that happens as a result of unfore- 
seen causes—or, lastly, that which is causeless. But, 
as we know that nothing can happen without causes 
of some kind, the term “accident” is divested of real 
meaning when it is used in the last of these senses. 
Yet this is the sense that is sought to be placed upon 
it by the objection which we are considering. If the 
objectors will but understand the term in its correct 
philosophical sense—or in the only sense in which 
it presents any meaning at all,—they will see that 
Z 2 
