The Study of Consciousness and Behavior 13 
Nor is it true that physical facts are known to many 
- observers and mental facts to but one, who is or has or 
‘directly experiences them. | If it were true, sociology, 
economics, history, anthropology and the like would 
either be physical sciences or represent no knowledge at 
all. The kind of knowledge of which these sciences and 
the common judgments of our fellow men are made up is 
knowledge possessed by many observers in common, the 
individual of whom the facts is known, knowing the fact 
in part in just the same way that the others know it. 
The real difference between a man’s scientific judgments 
about himself and the judgment of others about him is 
that he has added sources of knowledge. Much of what 
goes on in him influences him in ways other than those 
in which it influences other men. But this difference is 
not coterminous with that between judgments about his 
‘mind’ and about his ‘body.’ As was pointed out in the 
case of body-temperature, a man knows certain facts about 
his own body in such additional ways. 
Furthermore, there is no more truth in the statement 
that a man’s pain or anxiety or opinions are matters of 
direct consciousness, pure experience, than in the statement 
that his length, weight and temperature are, or that the sun, 
moon and stars are. If by the pain we must mean the pain 
as felt by some one, then by the sun we can mean only the 
sun as seen by some one. Pain and sun are equally subjects 
for a science of ‘consciousness as such.’ But if by the 
sun is meant the sun of common sense, physics and astron- 
omy, the sun as known by any one, then by the pain we 
can mean the pain of medicine, economics and sociology, the 
pain as known by any one, and by the sufferer long after 
he was or had it. 
All facts emerge from the matrix of pure experience; 
