The Study of Consciousness and Behavior 11 
also, as with the toothache, have data from internal sense- 
organs and perhaps from centrally initiated neural actions. 
In so far as he could report these data to himself for use 
in scientific thought more efficiently than he could report 
them to the other observers, he would have, as with the 
toothache, an advantage comparable to the advantage 
of a criminologist who happened also to be or to have been 
a thief, or of a literary critic who happened to have written 
what he judged. It is important to note that only in so 
far as he who has ‘immediate experience’ of or participates 
in or is ‘directly conscious’ of the anxiety, reports it to 
himself as thinker or scientific student, in common. with 
the other nineteen, that this advantage accrues: To 
really be or have the anxiety is not to correctly know it. 
An insane man must become sane in order to know his 
insane condition. Bigotry, stupidity and false reasoning 
can be understood only by one who never was them or has 
ceased to be them. 
In our last illustration, John’s thinking of ‘9 X 7 equals 
63,’ the effect on John’s behavior may be so complicated 
by other conditions in John, and is so subject to the par-. 
ticular conditions which we name John’s ‘will,’ that the 
observers would often be at loss except for John’s verbal 
report. Not that the observer is restricted to that. If 
21 
John does the example x 6g in the usual way, it is a very 
safe inference that he thought 9 x 7 equals 63, regardless 
of the absence of a verbal report from him. But often there 
is little else to go by. To John himself, on the contrary, 
it is easier to be sure that he is thinking of 9 x 7 equals 
63, than that he has a particular sort and strength of tooth- 
.se. Consequently if we suppose John to be thinking 
“eh fact while under observation, and the twenty ob- 
