Experimental Study of Associative Processes 67 
should stand for the mammalian mind in general, barring the ~ 
primates.; My second reason is that I hate to burden the 
reader with the disgusting rhetoric which would result if 
I had to insert particularizations and reservations at every 
step. The word ‘animal’ is too useful, rhetorically, to be 
sacrificed. Finally, inasmuch as most of my theorizing 
will be in the line of denying certain relatively high functions 
to animals, the evidence from cats and dogs is sufficient, 
for they are from among the most intelligent animals, and 
functions of the kind to be discussed, if absent in their 
case, are probably absent from the others. 
REASONING OR INFERENCE 
The first great question is whether or not animals are ever 
led to do any of their acts by reasoning. Do they ever con- 
clude from inference that a certain act will produce a certain 
desired result,and so doit? The-best opinion has beernttat 
they do | not, The best interpretation of even the most 
extraordinary performances of animals has been that they 
were the result of accident and association or imitation. 
But it has after all been only opinion and interpretation, 
and the opposite theory persistently reappears in the litera- 
ture of the subject.'_So, although it is in a way superfluous to 
give the coup de grace to the despised theory that animals 
reason, I think it is worth while to settle this question once 
for all.. 
“The great support of those who do claim for animals the 
ability to infer has been their wonderful performances which 
resemble our own. These could not, they claim, have hap- 
pened by accident. No animal could learn to open a latched 
gate by accident. The whole substance of the argument 
vanishes if, as a matter of fact, animals do learn those things 
