80 Animal Intelligence 
makes use of the sequence seen, transfers the process to 
himself; in the common human sense of the word, he 
imitates, 'This kind of imitation is surely common in 
human life: It may be apparent in ontogeny before any 
power of inference is shown. After that power does appear, 
it still retains a wide scope, and teaches us a majority, per- 
haps, of the ordinary accomplishments of our practical life. 
Now, as the writers of books about animal intelligence 
have not differentiated this meaning from the other possible 
ones, it is impossible to say surely that they have uniformly 
credited it to animals, and it is profitless to catalogue here 
their vague statements. Many opposers of the ‘reason’ 
theory have presupposed such a process and used it to replace 
reason as the cause of some intelligent performances. The 
upholders of the reason theory have customarily recognized 
such a process and claimed to have discounted it in their 
explanations of the various anecdotes. So we found 
Mr. Romanes, in the passage quoted, discussing the possi- 
bility that such an imitative process, without reason, could 
account for the facts. In his chapter on Imitation in 
‘Habit and Instinct,’ Principal C. Lloyd Morgan, the sanest 
writer on comparative psychology, seems to accept imita- 
tion of this sort as a fact, though he could, if attacked, 
explain most of his illustrations by the simple forms. The 
fact is, as was said before, that no one has analyzed or 
systematized the phenomena, and so one cannot find clear, 
decisive statements to quote. 
At any rate, whether previous authorities have agreed 
that such a process is present or not, it is worth while to 
tackle the question; and the formation of associations by 
imitation, if it occurs, is an important division of the forma- 
tion of associations in general. The experiments and their 
results may now be described. 
