Experimental Study of Associative Processes 109 
and that, therefore, and therefore only, a certain situation 
brings forth a certain act. Returning to our analysis of 
the association, this theory would say that there was no (9) 
or (10) or (3) or (4), that the sense-impression gave rise, 
when accompanied by the feeling of discomfort, to the im- 
pulse (5) directly, without the intervention of any represen- 
tations of the taste of the food, or the experience of being 
outside, or the sight of oneself doing the act. This theory 
might be modified so as to allow that the representations 
could be there, but to deny that they were necessary, were 
inevitably present, that the impulse was connected to the 
sense-impression through them. It would then claim that 
the effective part of the association was a direct pond be- 
the possiblity of there being an aura Ti memories en 
the process. It then” becomes a mitior question of inter- 
“pretation which will doubtless sooner or later demand an 
answer. I shall not try to answer it now. The more 
radical question, the question of the utter exclusion of rep- 
resentative trains of thought, of any genuine association 
of ideas from the mental life of animals, is worth serious 
consideration. I confess that, although certain authentic 
anecdotes and certain experiments, to be described soon, 
lead me to reject this exclusion, there are many qualities 
in animals’ behavior which seem to back it up. If one takes 
his stand by a rigid application of the law of parsimony, he 
will find justification for this view which no experiments of 
mine can overthrow. 
Of one thing I am sure, and that is that it is worth while 
to state the question and how to solve it, for although the 
point of view involved is far removed from that of our lead- 
ing psychologists to-day, it cannot long remain so. I am 
sorry that I cannot pretend to give a final decision. 
