IIo Animal Intelligence 
The view seems preposterous because, if an animal has 
sense-impressions when his brain is excited by currents start- 
ing in the end-organs, it seems incredible that he should not 
be conscious in imagination and memory by having similar 
excitations caused from within.| We are accustomed to 
think of memory as the companion of sensation. But, 
after all, it is a question of fact whether the connections in 
the cat brain include connections between present sensation- 
neuroses and past sensation-neuroses.) The only connec- 
tions may be those between the former and impulse-neu- 
roses, and there is no authoritative reason why we should 
suppose any others unless they are demonstrated by the 
cat’s behavior. This is just the point at issue. Such evi- 
dence as the phenomena of animals’ dreams does not at all 
prove the presence of memory or imagination. A dog may 
very well growl in his sleep without any idea of a hostile 
dog. The impulse to growl may be caused by chance ex- 
citement of its own neurosis without any sensation-neu- 
rosis being concerned. Acts of recognition may have no 
feelings of recognition going with or causing them. A 
sense-impression of me gets associated in my dog’s mind 
with the impulses to jump on me, lick my hand, wag 
his tail, etc. If, after a year, the connection between the 
two has lasted, he will surely jump on me, lick my hand 
and wag his tail, thopgh he has not and never had any 
representation of ee 
The only logical way to go at this question and settle it 
is, I think, to find some associations the formation of which 
requires the presence of images, of ideas. You have to give 
an animal a chance to associate sense-impression A with 
sense-impression B and then to associate B with some act 
C so that the presence of B in the mind will lead to the 
performance of C. Presumably the representation of B, 
