114 Animal Intelligence 
Before leaving the topic an account may be given of ex- 
periments similar to the one described above as performed 
on Cats 3 and 4, which were undertaken with Cat 13 and 
Dogs 1, 2 and 3. 
Cat 13 was fed with pieces of fish at the top of the wire 
netting 45 times, to accustom it to climbing up when it saw 
to do so, but as if the stimulus in question made immediate connection with 
the response itself or an intimately associated impulse. 
The experiments had in this respect both a negative or destructive and a 
positive or constructive meaning. On the one hand, they showed that animal 
learning was not homologous with human association of ideas; that animal 
learning was not human learning minus abstract and conceptual thought, 
but was on a still ‘lower’ level. On the other hand, the first positive evi- 
~dence that animals could, under certain circumstances, learn, as man so 
commonly does, by the indirect connection of a response with a situation 
through some non-sensory relic or representative of the latter, came from my 
experiments. 
It was perhaps natural that the more exciting denial of habitual learning 
by ideas should have attracted more attention than the somewhat tedious 
experiments to prove that under certain conditions they could so learn. 
At all events, a perverse tradition seems to have grown up to the effect that 
-I denied the possibility of animals having images or learning in any case by 
representative thinking. 
There is some excuse for this tradition in the fact that whereas the proof 
that the habitual learning of these dogs and cats did not require ‘ideas’ 
is clear and emphatic, my evidence that certain features of their behavior 
did require ‘ideas’ is complicated and imperfect. 
The fact seems to be that a ‘free idea’ comes in the animals or in man 
only as a result of a somewhat elaborate process of analysis or extraction from 
a gross total sensory process. The primary level or grade of experience, 
common to animals and little babies, comprises states of mind such as an 
adult man gets if lost in anger, fear, suffocation, dyspepsia, looking at a 
panorama of unknown objects with head upside down, smelling the mir ‘ure 
of odors of a soap factory, driving a golf ball, dashing to the net in a gam “08 
tennis, warding off a blow, or swimming under water. For a man to ge}a 
distinct controllable percept of approaching asthma, of a carpet loom se ‘n 
upside down, or of a successful ‘carry through,’ or ‘smash’ or ‘lo, 
so that one knows just what one is experiencing or doing, and can recall 
just what one experienced or did, requires further experienc’_ of the elemenv 
in question — contemplation of it in isolation or dealings with :t in many varied 
