Experimental Study of Associative Processes 115 
me come with fish. I then went through the same process 
as with 3 and 4, but at intervals of 60 to go seconds instead 
of 120. After go such trials it occasionally climbed up a 
little way, but though 135 trials in all were given, it never 
made the uniform and definite reaction which 3 and 4 did. 
It reacted, when it reacted at all, at from 5 to 9 seconds after « 
the signal. Whether age, weight, lack of previous habitual 
climbing when I approached, or a slowness in forming the 
association made the difference, is uncertain. 
Dog 1 was experimented on in the following manner: I 
would put him in a big pen, 20-10 feet, and sit outside facing 
it, he watching me as was his habit. I would pound with a 
stick and say, ‘‘Go over to the corner.” After an interval 
(10 seconds for 35 trials, 5 seconds for 60 trials) I would go 
over to the corner (12 feet off) and drop a piece of meat 
there. He, of course, followed and secured it. On the 6th, 
connections. So for a cat to get a distinct controllable percept of a loop, 
or of its own clawing or nosing or pulling, it must have the capacity to an-. 
alyze such elements out of the total gross complexes in which they inhere,’ 
and also certain means or stimuli to such analysis. 
This capacity or tendency the cats and dogs do, in my opinion, possess,’ 
though in a far less degree than the average child. They also suffer from - 
lack of stimuli to the exercise of the capacity. Their confinement, for the,, 
most part, to the direct sensory experience of things and acts, is due in part| 
to the weakness of the capacity or tendency of their neurones to act in great . 
detail, and in part to the lack of such stimuli as visual exploration of things 
in detail, manual manipulation of the same thing in many ways, and the iden- 
tification of elements of objects and acts by language. They get few free. 
ideas because they are less ready than man to get them under the same con- 
ditions and because their instinctive behavior and social environment offer 
conditions that are less favorable. The task of getting an animal to have 
some free ideational representative of a red loop or of pushing up a button 
with the nose may be compared with that of getting a very stupid boy to 
have a free ideational representative of acceleration, or of the act of sound- 
ing th. The difference between them and man which is so emphasized in 
the text, though real and of enormous practical importance, is thus not at 
all a mysterious gap or trackless desert. We can see our way from animal 
to human learning. 
